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PREFACE
The work described in this report was performed by the Network Operations
Team of the Tracking and Data Acquisition Organization of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL). It is the third and final volume in a series and reports the
support of the network for 1971 and 1972. It covers the Apollo missions 14
through 17.
During these flights, Deep Space Network (DSN) operations were limited to the
cislunar and lunar phases. The DSN provided network operations control activ-
ity in the Space Flight Operations Facility (SFOF), three 26-m stations at
Goldstone, Madrid and Canberra, and the Mars station at Goldstone with its
64-m-diameter antenna.
N. A. Renzetti
Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition
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ABSTRACT
This report summarizes the Deep Space Network (DSN) activities in support
of Project Apollo during the period of 1971 and 1972. Beginning with the
Apollo 14 mission and concluding with the Apollo 17 mission, the narrative
includes a mission description, the NASA support requirements placed on the
DSN, and a comprehensive account of the support activities provided by each
committed DSN deep space communication station. Associated equipment and
activities of the three elements of the DSN (i. e., the Deep Space Instrumentation
Facility (DSIF), the Space Flight Operations Facility (SFOF), and the Ground
Communications Facility (GCF)) used in meeting the radio-metric and telemetry
demands of the missions are documented.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL.
Volume I of this series discussed the development of the Apollo project,
the unified S-band communication system, the dual DSN and MSFN deep space
communication stations which permitted the DSN to act as a backup to the MSFN,
and the flights of Apollo 4 through Apollo 8. These were the major milestones
that were to lead to the flight of Apollo 11 and the first successful manned
lunar landing on the moon in June 1969.
Volume II covered the DSN support provided during Apollo Missions 9
through 13.
B. SCOPE.
This report, Volume III, summarizes and provides a historical account
of the operational support activities provided to the MSFN by the JPL DSN
in support of Apollo Missions 14 through 17.
The narrative is presented in chronological order and includes the
following subject matter:
(1) Mission Description - a recapitulation of significant events of the
mission from launch through splashdown.
(2) Requirements for DSN Support - the technical objectives of the mission
which the DSN was required to meet.
(3) DSN Mission Support - a chronology of DSN premission and mission
operational activities.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the location of the Apollo lunar landing sites. The
locations of the DSN deep space communications stations which provided
operational support for the Apollo missions are shown in Figure 1-2.
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Figure 1-2. Location of DSN Stations used for Apollo Support
SECTION II
THE APOLLO 14 MISSION
A. MISSION DESCRIPTION.
Apollo 14 was the seventh manned Apollo mission flown above the three-
stage Saturn V launch vehicle and carried astronauts Alan B. Shepard, Jr.
(Commander), Stuart Allen Roosa (Command Module Pilot), and Edgar Dean
Mitchell (Lunar Module Pilot). The mission goal was to land in the Fra Mauro
uplands, the same goal that the abortive Apollo 13 mission was unable to
achieve. The Apollo 14 mission successfully accomplished its objectives in
spite of a large number of minor problems, which are mentioned in the follow-
ing discussion.
Launch from Cape Kennedy Pad 39A occurred at 21:03:02.9 GMT on
January 31, 1971, at a launch azimuth of 75.56 degrees. The launch had
originally been scheduled for a 20:23 GMT launch, but a launch hold of some
40 minutes was required due to the new weather restrictions developed after
the lightning strikes of Apollo 12. This was the first time a manned Apollo
mission was not launched on time. Injection into translunar trajectory occurred
midway through the second revolution in the Earth parking orbit with a 5-minute
49-second burn of the S-IVB-stage engine.
Following translunar injection (TLI), the Command/Service Module (CSM)
separated from the booster and attempted to dock with the unattended Lunar
Module (LM). For the first time on Apollo, this docking procedure was unsuc-
cessful, with the capture latches of the docking probe failing to seize the Lunar
Module drogue. Without a successful docking there would be no lunar landing,
although the crew was in no danger. The docking had to be accomplished within
several hours before the S-IVB attitude-control system became inoperative and
the S-IVB and Lunar Module started to tumble. Under direction from Mission
Control Center in Houston, the astronauts made five additional docking attempts
in various configurations. On the sixth attempt, docking was successful.
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After docking, the probe was removed from the Command Module/Lunar
Module tunnel for examination. No abnormal behavior or contamination could
be detected, and the mission was given the "go-ahead" for lunar landing. After
separation from the spacecraft, the S-IVB (the launch vehicle third stage) was
directed toward a crash on the Moon as a calibration of the seismometer left
there during the Apollo 12 mission. The impact occurred at 07:40:55 GMT on
February 4, 1971, at lunar coordinates 80 03! S, 260 03' W, approximately
174 km southwest of the seismometer which showed vibrations for some 2 hours.
Midcourse correction 1 was deleted due to the accuracy of the translunar
injection maneuver. Midcourse correction 2 was executed at 03:39 GMT on
February 2, 1971, removing the spacecraft from its "free-return" trajectory
to save fuel for the lunar landing sequence. The remainder of the translunar
cruise was nominal except for an observed dip from 37. 0 to 36. 7 V in one of
the Lunar Module ascent stage batteries. This dip, first noticed during the
Lunar Module checkout at 10:56 GMT on February 3, caused some concern 
and
a test was executed at 02:38 GMT, February 4, which confirmed that the battery
would properly support a load.
Other minor problems during translunar coast included difficulty in main-
taining correct pointing of the spacecraft high-gain antenna and a high rate 
of
pressure decrease during a cabin leak check. The latter 
problem was caused
by a urine vent valve being accidently left open. Midcourse 
correction 3 was
deleted but a small midcourse correction 4 was executed at 02:01 GMT,
February 4, with the burn lasting less than 1 second.
A successful lunar orbit insertion (LOI) burn put the spacecraft in a 315-
by 110-km (169.6- by 58.9-nmi) elliptical orbit. Two orbits later a 
descent
orbit insertion (DOI) burn changed these dimensions to 110 by 17.2 km (59.0 by
9.3 nmi). During lunar orbit, additional pointing problems with the high-gain
Command/Service Module antenna were experienced.
During lunar orbit 12, the Command/Service Module and Lunar Module
separated with astronauts Shepard and Mitchell in the Lunar Module 
preparing
for descent to the lunar surface on orbit 14. Difficulty was experienced
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maintaining lock on the Lunar Module high-gain antenna, but behavior was
normal on the next orbit. An abort pushbutton sent erroneous inputs to the
Lunar Module guidance computer on four occasions. The button may have been
defective or contaminated since tapping on the switch panel cleared up the
problem. The computer was reprogrammed to ignore these abort inputs.
During the descent phase, the landing radar came on in the "near" mode
(1066.8 m (3500 ft) maximum) instead of the "far" mode. This problem was
first noticed when the.radar failed to acquire lock when passing through 9. 15 km
(30, 000 ft). The radar was turned off and on, and lock was acquired.
The landing was normal and was within 20 m of the intended landing site.
After more than 5 hours of preparation, the two astronauts began their first
excursion during which surface samples were collected; the ALSEP and TV
camera were deployed, and the "thumper" was activated. The "thumper" is a
hand-held rod which taps the lunar surface as a small explosive charge within
it is detonated. This device proved to be especially unreliable, and the astro-
naut was able to detonate only 13 of the 21 charges. Due to this problem and
several others including difficulty unfolding the S-band erectable antenna, a
twisted urine tube in the Commander's suit, a broken wrist cable in the Lunar
Module Pilot's suit, and an EVA (extra-vehicular activity) radio problem, the
astronauts fell behind their planned timeline and were unable to complete all
assigned tasks.
During the ensuing rest period, an S-band bistatic radar experiment was
conducted between the orbiting Command/Service Module and DSS 14. This
experiment is discussed below. Also during the rest period, the Lunar Module
astronauts conducted a pressure check of the space suits to confirm that an
abnormally high leak rate on the Lunar Module Pilot's suit had not increased
to the danger level. All was in order and the astronauts began the second
excursion 2 hours and 28 minutes ahead of schedule. This excursion was to
take the astronauts 1000 m to the edge of Rim crater. Although this goal was
not quite reached, many rock samples of new and different types were collected.
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Lunar liftoff, rendezvous, and docking were normal with none of the
problems of the earlier docking. Following transfer of the lunar samples to
the Command/Service Module, the LM was jettisoned and directed toward a
crash on the Moon near the ALSEP seismometer. One orbit later, on orbit
number 35, the crew executed the trans-Earth injection burn to start the return
trip to Earth.
Apollo 14 landed at approximately 172 degrees W, 27 degrees S, midway
between Samoa and New Zealand.
Table 2-1 shows the mission event times and Table 2-2 gives the television
coverage. Care must be exercised when using ground elapsed time (GET),
which on previous missions recorded the time from launch. With Apollo 14's
launch slip (the first on Apollo), the clock carries a different meaning. In
order to make the sun angles upon lunar landing identical to the premission
plans, the translunar trajectory was made 40 minutes faster than planned. The
GET clock was then set forward 40 minutes and 3 seconds at 03:38:03 GMT on
February 3. A new clock, actual elapsed time (AET), records the time from
launch, and the GET clock is merely a convenient reference time which cor-
responds very closely to the planned mission timeline.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DSN SUPPORT OF APOLLO 14.
1. DSN/MSFN Wing Stations.
As was done during previous Apollo lunar missions, DSS 11, 42, and
61 were committed to support Apollo 14 under direct MSFN/MSC control start-
ing at launch minus 2 weeks through the end of the mission.
2. DSS 14.
The Mars station, DSS 14, was required to receive voice, telemetry,
biomedical, and TV and relay the data to the Goldstone Prime MSFN station
(GDS). Specific requirements existed for lunar landing, EVA television, and
LM crash. Coverage was also desired for television during translunar coast.
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00o Table 2-1. Apollo 14 Sequence of Major Events
Ground Actual Ground Actual
Greenwich Mean Greenwich Mean
elapsed elapsed elapsed elapsed
Event time, time, Time Event time, time, Time
h:min:s h h:mis h:min: h:min:s h:mins
Launch 00:00:00 00:00:00 Jan 31/21:03:03 Undock 104:28:03 103:48:00 Feb 05/04:51:03
TLI ignition 02:28:30 02:28:30 Jan 31/23:31:33 CSM circularization 105:46:48 105:06:45 Feb 05/06:09:48
TLI cutoff 02:34:19 02:34:19 Jon 31/23:37:22 Powered descent 108:42:01 108:01:58 Feb 05/09:05:01
r;hit midcourse Deleted initlction
(TL 9 h) Touchdown 108:55:14 108:15:11 Feb 05/09:18:14
Second midcourse 30:36:07 30:36:07 Feb 02/03:39:10
(to hybrid) Begin EVA-I 114:20:00 113:39:57 Feb 05/14:43:00
(TLI + 28 h) ALSEP activated 117:05:00 116:24:57 Feb 05/17:28:00
Begin bistatic fre- 52:20:00 52:20:00 Feb 03/01:23:03 ALSEP high-bit 117:36:00 116:55:57 Feb 05/17:59:00
quency measure- rate on
ment
End bitatic re- 52:25:00 5225:00 Feb 03/0128:03 ALSEP high-bit 118:14:00 117:33:57 Feb 05/18:37:00End bistatic fre- 52:25:00 52:25:00 Feb 03/01:28:03d rate offquency measure-
ment End EVA-I 119:04:00 118:23:57 Feb 05/19:27:00
(D Change ground 55:15:03 54:35:00 Feb 03/03:38:03 Begin bistatic radar 130:05:00 129:24:57 Feb 06/06:28:000
elapsed time
End bistatic. radar 131:04:00 130:23:57 Feb 06/07:27:00
Begin LM inspection 60:59:00 60:18:57 Feb 03/09:22:00
T u Begin EVA-2 131:48:14 131:08:11 Feb 06/08:11:14Third midcourse Deleted
(LOI - 22 h) End EVA-2 136:19:00 135:38:57 Feb 06/12:42:00
(0 Fourth midcourse 77:38:13 76:58:10 Feb 04/02:01:13 LM ascent 142:25:43 141:45:40 Feb 06/18:48:43
(LOI - 5 h)
O CSM/LM docking 144:12:00 143:31:57 Feb 06/20:35:00
Second LM inspec- 78:14:58 77:34:55 Feb 04/02:37:58
tion (30 min) LM separation 146:25:00 145:44:57 Feb 06/22:48:00
CSM first 82:23:03 81:43:00 Feb 04/06:46s03 LM deorbit burn 147:54:00 147:13:57 Feb 07/00:17:00
occultation LM crash 148:22:25 147:42:23 Feb 07/00:45:25
Lunar orbit 82:36:43 81:56:40 Feb 04/06:59:43
insertion Trans-Earth 149:16:04 148:36:01 Feb 07/01:39:04
I injection
S-IVB impact 83:17:55 82:37:52 Feb 04/07:40:55
Fifth midcourse 166:14:00 165:33:57 Feb 07/18:37:00
Descent orbit 86:50:55 86:10:52 Feb 04/11:13:55
insertion Splashdown 216:42:01 216:01:58 Feb 09/21:05:01
O
Table 2-2. Apollo 14 Television
GMT, h:min GET, AET, Duration, Subject Vehicle Stations
h:min h:min h:min
Feb 1/00:07 03:04 03:04 01:55 Transportation and docking CSM GDS
Feb 1/08:09 11:06 11:06 01:06 Inspection of docking probe CSM GDS
Feb 3/09:04 60:41 60:01 00:41 Interior of spacecraft CSM HSK
Feb 5/14:56 114:33 113:53 06:30 EVA-) LM HSK/MAD
Feb 6/07:34 131:11 130:31 05:20 EVA-2 LM GDS/HSK
Feb 6/20:12 143:49 143:09 00:09 Rendezvous CSM MAD
Feb 6/20:27 144:04 143:24 00:10 Docking CSM MAD
Feb 8/01:21 171:58 171:18 00:51 Inflight demonstrations CSM GDS
Feb 8/23:31 195:08 194:28 00:25 Press briefing CSM GDS
"GDS = Goldstone MSFN station
HSK = Honeysuckle MSFN station, Australia
MAD = Madrid MSFN station, Spain
3. Precision Doppler Data.
As part of a continuing study of lunar potential anomalies (mascons),
DSS 14 was required to provide precision doppler recordings of the Command/
Service Module during several low lunar orbits and of the Lunar Module during
the descent phase and later during the crash. An additional internal DSN require-
ment was levied for more doppler data during all low Command/Service Module
orbits and several adjoining high orbits in support of a JPL study of mascons
(with the same principal investigator as the one who originated the formal
requirement). As one can see from the timeline (Figure 2-1), one pass from
DSS 62 was necessary to provide almost complete coverage of this requirement.
A related requirement was for high-speed strip-chart recordings of DSS 14
received signal level during orbit 3 of the Command/Service Module, descent
and touchdown of the Lunar Module, and the crash of the Lunar Module.
4. Bistatic Radar Experiment.
On April 14, 1969, Stanford University submitted a formal proposal to
NASA to conduct an experiment, Downlink Bistatic Radar Study of the Moon,
using DSS 14. The specific goals of this experiment are:
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Figure 2-1. DSN Internal Mascon Study Requirement
I
0I-
(a) To determine the Brewster angle of the lunar crust at S-band
(b) To measure the spectral properties of bistatic radar echoes
from low-altitude orbit
(c) To gain operational experience with Apollo systems and operations
as an aid in the design of future bistatic radar experiments
The experiment should reveal fundamental new scientific information on the
upper few centimeters of the lunar crust through a short wavelength determina-
tion of the Brewster angle of the lunar surface, and should provide engineering
data necessary for optimizing the design of future bistatic radar experiments
from low lunar orbits (approximately 100-km altitude). Furthermore, the
results should provide a lunar S-band, bistatic radar calibration which would
have considerable utility in the interpretation of similar experiments conducted
in the future at the planets.
It was proposed that the downlink CSM S-band signal would be directed
toward the lunar surface. At DSS 14 the reflected signal (and a portion of the
direct signal) would be received in two polarizations simultaneously using the
polarization diversity S-band cone. The outputs of the two receiver chains
would be recorded on FR 1400 recorders.
5. Goldstone Timing Synchronization.
An obsolete time sync agreement in effect since Apollo 11, which pro-
vided for routine measurements with a DSIF portable cesium clock at all
Goldstone/Apollo support sites, was amended on June 9, 1970. The new agree-
ment, which will be valid for all future Apollo missions, is as follows:
A one pulse-per-second tick is distributed via DSN microwave to
DSS 14. The pulse originates in the DSIF Standards Laboratory,
arrives at the sites with known offsets, and is accurate to better than
5 ls. This signal is made available to the MSFN at the MSFN micro-
wave interface at DSS 14. The portable cesium clock will be used
only to calibrate the microwave delays when changes have occurred
to the microwave system. Routine support with the portable clock will
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be discontinued. In the case of a bona fide timing emergency, the
portable cesium clock will be available with a delay of 2 hours during
the normal working day and 48 hours otherwise. Following any clock
trip a TWX giving the results with respect to the National Bureau of
Standards and the expected National Bureau of Standards-U.S. Naval
Observatory offset will be sent out to interested parties.
6. Twenty-Kilowatt Uplink.
Original plans for the operation of the Wing stations were for two
simultaneous 10-kW radiated uplink signals. This was accomplished using two
20-kW transmitters fed into a combiner which introduced a 3-dB loss. Thus,
10 kW of power from each transmitter was radiated from the antenna. The
other 10 kW from each transmitter, which was lost in the combiner, was dissi-
pated in a 20-kW water load. When transmitting a single uplink, there was no
longer a need for the combiner and its accompanying 3-dB loss, and a non-
standard configuration was entered at some Wing sites which bypassed the
combiner, allowing a single 20-kW radiated power uplink. Unfortunately,
since this was not a standard configuration, the combiner water load interlock
was not disabled; that is, any failure in the water load would shut down the
transmitter, even though the water load was not in use. No changes could be
authorized because the radiation of a single 20-kW uplink had never been
requested or committed.
On June 12, 1970, GSFC levied an official requirement upon the DSN for
the 20-kW capability. An Engineering Change Order was issued to disable the
water load interlock when in the 20-kW configuration. The modifications were
completed in November 1970. Certain operational limitations remain:
(a) There exists no backup 20-kW capability since the installed
microwave switching gear allows only one transmitter (the DSN
transmitter) to be switched around the combiner.
(b) All uplinks must be turned off before any microwave switching
can occur.
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7. Wing Site Support of ALSEP.
ALSEP communications are usually accomplished using the 9-m
(30-ft) antennas of the MSFN. In September 1969, the DSN received a require-
ment for the Wing sites to track ALSEP during the Active Seismic Experiment
on ALSEP No. 4 during the Apollo 14 mission period. During this new experi-
ment, the ALSEP transmits at 10. 6 kbits/s, a higher rate than past ALSEPs
and beyond the capability of the 9-m (30-ft) stations. The experiment is dubbed
the "thumper" because of a series of small charges which are actuated by the
astronauts to generate artificial seismic waves.
C. APOLLO INTERFACE TEAM.
Between Apollos 13 and 14, the DSIF was reorganized to eliminate the
separate positions of Operations Engineering, Operations Planning, and System
Data Analysis (SDA) for Apollo. Instead the DSIF planning efforts are repre-
sented by a single DSIF Operations Project Engineer for Apollo, and some of
the operations functions, such as predict generation, have been assumed by the
DSN mission independent operations organization.
D. PREMISSION PREPARATIONS AND TESTING.
1. DSN/MSFN Wing Stations.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 were placed under configuration control for the
Apollo 14 mission as of 00:01 GMT on January 17, 1971, and subsequently
placed on mission status by the MSFN as of 00:01 GMT on January 21, 1971.
Prior to January 21, each Wing site conducted extensive maintenance and test-
ing of the equipment common to the DSN and MSFN. The new requirement for
Wing support of the ALSEP indicated a need for ALSEP premission testing.
The downlink tests pose no problem, but the ALSEP uplink frequency (2119 MHz)
is at the extreme end of the normally used band (MSFN: 2100-2110 MHz; DSN:
2110-2118 MHz). Some tuning of the klystron power amplifier is therefore
needed. Unfortunately, the klystrons may be retuned only a finite number of
times before the cavity adjustment screws will bind up, requiring costly and
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time-consuming repair. In order to maintain these klystrons in good condition
for the mission, the DSN limited the MSFN to one ALSEP uplink test at each
Wing site. These tests, conducted on January 11 and 12, failed at all three
Wing sites due to identical intersite microwave problems unrelated to the kly-
strons. It is unfortunate that the results of the first test were not applied to the
second and third site. Nevertheless, the MSFN requested additional testing and,
after management discussions, one additional test at each site (January 23 and
24) was allowed. Later investigation may show that this testing is related to the
transmitter problems experienced during the mission.
2. DSS 14.
In addition to the bistatic experiment tests and the predict tests men-
tioned below, DSS 14 conducted three tests before the Apollo 14 mission (see
Table 2-3). The first was an officially required participation in Day 5 of the
MSFN network readiness test. DSS 14 's participation turned out to be nothing
more than a data transmission test between the DSS 14 communications center
and the Goldstone MSFN station. The second test was an internal DSIF configu-
ration verification test on January 19. The third test was an extensive data
flow test with a spacecraft simulator used at DSS 14 to generate data which
were fed through the entire system ending at the Goldstone MSFN station. Due
to delays the test required more than the allotted 24 hours on January 21, and
the television and Lunar Module tests were rescheduled on January 27. Configu-
ration control was imposed on DSS 14 to January 17.
3. Bistatic Experiment Preparations.
A meeting was held at JPL on May 8, 1970 to discuss the feasibility of
the proposed experiment. In attendance were representatives of MSC, GSFC,
NASA Headquarters, North American Rockwell, Stanford University, and the
DSN, DSIF, and GCF. The potential problem areas were identified and a
number of action items were assigned. Shortly afterward a support require-
ment was issued at MSC (May 19, 1970). The final details on the configuration
at DSS 14 were discussed at another meeting at JPL on November 9, 1970 with
approximately the same representation as the May 8 meeting.
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Table 2-3. DSS 14 Tests
Date Time, h:min Test Comments
12/21/70 16:00-24:00 Bistatic cable
installation
12/22/70 22:00-02:01 Bistatic equipment
checkout
12/23/70 02:01-06:00 Bistatic track of Receivers 3 and 4
Pioneer VI not yet installed;
no 152.4 cm/s
(60 ips) narrow-
band frequency
modulation
FR 1400
modules
01/08/71 Day 5 of network Data transmission
readiness test test
01/08/71 22:30-05:30 Bistatic test During Pioneer VI
track; used
Pioneer VI
signal; FR 1400
not available
01/19/71 Configuration
verification test
01/21/71 14:20-14:20 Data flow test
(24 h)
01/27/71 14:18-22:17 Data flow test TV and LM tests
01/28/71 20:00-07:10 Bistatic final
calibration
A number of installation periods and tests were conducted from late
December 1970 until launch on January 31. These tests are included in
Table 2-3.
4. DSN Predicts.
Predict data for DSS 14 is generated in two ways. The prime method
uses state vectors supplied by Houston MSC or Goddard Space Flight Center,
and generates DSN predicts in the SFOF computers. The backup system
involves a 29-point acquisition message generated at MSC, transmitted directly
via TTY to DSS 14, and converted at DSS 14 from X-Y to HA-DEC coordinates
with an atmosphere refraction correction added if necessary.
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In November 1970 the DSIF served notice that it would not allow further
use of the 29-point conversion program because the software had never been
properly certified or documented, even though it had been successfully used on
several Apollo flights. To make matters worse, the SFOF IBM 7094/7044
computer system was about to be removed to make way for a second IBM 360/75,
and it was uncertain if the predict software for the 360 would be ready for
Apollo.
Several compromises were necessary. The 7044 was removed, but the
7094 was merely moved to a new location in the SFOF. The 7094, however,
lacked a high-speed printer (used for checking the predicts), adequate tape
drives (to lessen the required tape changes), and a 7044 to transmit the
predicts.
The missing 7044 was overcome by the procedure shown in Figure 2-2. A
state vector received in the SFOF was input to the 7094. The output tape was
then carried to the PDP-7 computer in the Media Conversion Center of the
SFOF where the predicts were transferred to TTY punched paper tape. This
tape was taken to a tape reader in the Communications Center, where a TTY
header was added, and the data was transmitted. A test of this system on
January 18 was successful except for a bad TTY punch in the Media Conversion
Center. The test was repeated on January 19 with complete success. In an
effort to obtain clearance to use the 29-point conversion program, a number of
tests were conducted starting in December 1970. The last tests on January 12
and 22 resulted in acceptance on an emergency backup, best-effort basis only.
E. APOLLO 14 OPERATIONS.
1. DSN/MSFN Wing Stations.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 successfully supported all phases of the Apollo 14
mission. The problems experienced are noted in Table 2-4. The many trans-
mitter problems are being investigated at this time.
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Figure 2-2. DSN Predict Generation for Apollo 14
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Table 2-4. Wing Station Tracking
DSS GMT, h:min Problem
11 I Jan 31/22:31-22:34 None
Jan 31/23:53-07:35 PA 4 (power amplifier) high-voltage
rectifier interlock; no apparent
reason. PA 3 arc detector trip; no
apparent reason
Feb 01/20:43-08:42 None
Feb 02/21:10-09:02 Maser 1 exhaust valve frozen; will
replace maser
Feb 03/21:17-08:54 PA 3 arc detector trip at 22:24;
switch to PA 4 after 19 seconds
Feb 04/21:13-10:05 PA 4 high-voltage ac overcurrent
trip; no apparent reason
Feb 05/21:53-10:54 None
Feb 07/00:01-11:21 None
Feb 07/23:37-11:32 None
Feb 08/23:30-12:06 PA 4 high-voltage ac overcurrent
trip; no apparent reason; PA was
in standby
42 Feb 01/04:45-12:25 Both klystron power supplies tripped
on beam overvoltage; transmitters
were not radiating
Feb 02/05:31-13:18 None
Feb 03/05:41-13:41 None
Feb 04/05:42-13:57 None
Feb 05/06:37-14:45 None
Feb 06/07:33-15:47 None
Feb 07/08:02-16:11 None
Feb 08/08:06-16:29 None
Feb 09/08:24-16:41 None
Feb 09/17:08-18:48 None (ALSEP track)
Feb 09/20:35-20:49 None
61 Feb 01/11:58-02:00 None
Feb 02/12:33-02:17 None
Feb 03/12:45-02:26 None
Feb 04/13:32-03:07 None
Feb 05/13:50-04:05 PA 2 excessive reflected power trip
during prefrack; retuned klystron
Feb 06/14:43-04:51 None
Feb 07/15:10-04:54 None
Feb 08/15:28-4:58 None
Feb 09/17:56-19:25 None
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2. DSS 14.
Seven passes were tracked as shown in Table 2-5. The only schedule
change occurred on February 4 when DSS 14 was requested to be on track
earlier than the scheduled 03:00 GMT in order to observe the second Lunar
Module checkout. This second checkout was to investigate the Lunar Module
battery problem, and it was thought that low power levels might have resulted
in a degraded telemetry signal. Accordingly, DSS 14 was tracking at 00:43 GMT
on February 4. DSS 14 experienced no problems that had any effect on Apollo 14
support.
3. DSS 62.
DSS 62 tracked the Command/Service Module as planned on February 4
from 13:32:18 to 22:12:47 GMT. The required doppler data was successfully
taken and sent to JPL.
4. Predict Operations.
It is apparent that the extraordinary care given to predict generation
problem before the mission paid off, because no problems were experienced
during the mission (unusual for Apollo). The personnel were eagerly coopera-
tive, and it is felt that this spirit is responsible for maintaining and operating
the system with so many known weak points.
Table 2-5. DSS 14 Tracking
Date, Feb 1971 GMT, h:min:s
1 01:13:50-06:30:00
2 00:30:52-06:30:00
2 22:59:00-04:30:00
4 00:43:00-09:55:00
4 21:07:15-10:57:40
5 21:42:34-11:51:40
6 22:40:00-06:00:00
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The 2 9-point acquisition messages were also used on occasion at DSS 14.
Several comparisons were made between the two types of predicts with no
significant discrepancies except for the Lunar Module powered descent. This
difference was anticipated since the 7094 predict program cannot model a long
duration burn with a changing force vector. Thus, the 29-point message was
much more accurate and was used for powered descent.
5. SFOF Participation.
The SFOF areas and equipment used for Apollo 14 included the Opera-
tions Area, the Network Analysis Area, the displays, the relocated 7094, and
the Media Conversion Center. The SFOF support is limited to predict genera-
tion and some off-line monitoring. As mentioned above, the support was
excellent.
F. GCF PARTICIPATION.
The DSN GCF provided voice and teletype circuits as required to support
the operations mentioned above. In addition, JPL acts as West Coast Switching
Center for the NASA Communications Network and handles many non-DSN cir-
cuits in support of Apollo. The only known GCF problem was a bad set of
communications processor log tapes covering parts of the precision doppler
data collection. These data were later recovered from the tracking data tapes
mailed from DSS 14 and DSS 62.
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SECTION III
THE APOLLO 15 MISSION
A. MISSION DESCRIPTION.
Apollo 15, the eighth manned Apollo mission flown above the three-stage
Saturn V launch vehicle, carried astronauts David R. Scott (Commander),
Alfred M. Worden (Command Module Pilot), and James B. Irwin (Lunar
Module Pilot). The mission goal was exploration of the canyon-link Hadley
Rille and the Apennine foothills. A second goal was the collection of scientific
data while in an extended lunar orbit phase.
Launch from Cape Kennedy Pad 39A occurred at 13:34:00. 79 GMT on
July 26, 1971, at a launch azimuth of 80. 088 degrees. Injection into translunar
trajectory over the Pacific Ocean occurred midway through the second
revolution in Earth parking orbit with a 5-minute 47-second burn of the S-IVB
stage engine. Translunar injection (TLI) put the spacecraft on a direct
trajectory toward the Moon, making Apollo 15 the first mission to abandon
entirely the "free-return" trajectory which requires no propulsion to return
to Earth. This direct trajectory conserves fuel for the critical landing
sequence.
Following TLI the Command Service Module (CSM) separated from the
booster, docked with the unattended Lunar Module (LM), and extracted the
LM from the S-IVB. The S-IVB was directed by ground command toward a
crash on the Moon as an additional calibration of the seismometers left there
by the Apollo 12 and 14 missions. The impact occurred at 20:58:41.75 GMT
on July 29 at lunar coordinates 1.00 S and 11.87 0 W, about 185 km (100 nmi)
from the Apollo 14 landing site.
Midcourse Correction 1 was deleted due to the accuracy of the TLI
maneuver. During the translunar cruise a short was noted in the CSM Service
Propulsion System thrust indicator circuit. This short would have caused prob-
lems during maneuvers, and a set of workaround procedures were developed.
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Midcourse Correction 2 was not needed, but was scheduled as a test of these
new procedures. Midcourse Correction 3 was deleted, and Midcourse
Correction 4 was a short 0. 92-second burn.
Other anomalies occurring during translunar cruise were a broken cover
glass on the LM range/range rate meter (no impact), a chlorinator valve leak
(tightened), and one strong voltage dip on the spacecraft ac and dc power
busses. The latter problem occurred only two seconds after loss of uplink
caused by a DSS 11 transmitter tripoff, prompting some concern that the two
events were related. Later investigation showed that a CSM circuit breaker
feeding some lighted pushbuttons on the spacecraft computer console had
tripped. A short large enough to trip the circuit breaker would also have
caused the voltage dips. The circuit breaker was never reset.
Shortly before entering lunar orbit, the astronauts blew off a door covering
the Scientific Instruments Module (SIM) of the Service Module (see Figure 3-1).
The SIM bay, a first for Apollo 15, carries scientific instruments for observa-
tion of the Moon from lunar orbit. The instruments include a gamma ray
spectrometer, an alpha particle spectrometer, a mass spectrometer, a laser
altimeter, a 7.62-cm (3-in.) mapping camera, and a 60.96-cm (24-in.) pano-
ramic camera.
A successful lunar orbit insertion (LOI) burn of 400.7 seconds put the
spacecraft into a 315- by 108-km (170- by 58-nmi) orbit. Two orbits later a
descent orbit insertion (DOI) burn lowered the spacecraft to a 109- by 17. 1-km
(58.5- by 9.2-nmi) orbit. A DOI trim maneuver later raised this perilune to
17.8 km (9.6 nmi).
During lunar orbit 12 the CSM and LM separated with astronauts Scott and
Irwin in the LM preparing for descent to the lunar surface on orbit 14. The
undocking was delayed approximately 26 minutes due to a poor connection on
the umbilical wire to the CSM docking probe. Shortly after undocking the CSM
maneuvered into a near-circular orbit 121 by 102 km (65.2 by 54.8 nmi).
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Figure 3-1. Scientific Instrument Module Bay of Service Module
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The approach to landing was steeper (25 degrees) than any Moon lander
before, providing extra clearance from the 3.66-km (12,000 ft) Apennine peaks.
The LM made a normal landing about 121. 92 m (400 ft) northeast of the target.
The actual landed location is 26.08350N and 3.6650 E. Soon after landing the
astronauts conducted a standup extravehicular activity (SEVA), which involved
depressurizing the cabin, opening the top (docking) hatch, and making a photo-
graphic and visual survey of the landing site from the top hatch. This activity
was partly to acquire visual reference points for subsequent navigation chores.
A sleep period followed, during which one of the two bistatic radar experiments
was conducted with the orbiting CSM.
During the first extravehicular activity (EVA) period the astronauts
deployed the lunar rover (Figure 3-2), used for the first time on Apollo 15.
Although the front steering was inoperative, the rear steering was sufficient,
and the crew drove to several small craters where scientific exploration,
surface sampling, and photographic documentation were completed. Observers
on Earth were able to watch the activities at each stopping point, thanks to the
new Lunar Communications Relay Unit (LCRU) (Figure 3-3). On previous
missions the astronauts' VHF transmissions were relayed to Earth by the LM,
but with the rover the men would travel beyond VHF range from the LM. Hence,
the LCRU was designed as a portable S-band/VHF transceiver, normally resting
on the rover, to keep the astronauts in contact with mission control. In addition
to voice and telemetry on the downlink, the video output of the LM camera could
be transmitted. The uplink carried capcom voice plus television commands
(pan, tilt, zoom). A special assembly on the rover provided a mounting plat-
form for the LM TV camera and actuated the camera according to the received
commands.
At the end of EVA number 1, the crew deployed the Apollo Lunar Surface
Experiments Package (ALSEP), which contains a seismometer and several
fields and particles experiments. The crew then re-entered the LM for an
eating and sleeping period during which the second bistatic radar experiment
was conducted with the CSM.
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Figure 3-2. Apollo 15 Lunar Rover
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Figure 3-3. View of Lunar Rover Showing Ground Commanded Television
Camera, Lunar Communications Relay Unit, and High- and
Low-Gain Antennas
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At the start of the second EVA, the steering problem in the rover was
cleared by resetting a circuit breaker. It was with a fully functioning rover
that the astronauts drove to another series of craters for sample collection and
scientific investigation, and returned to complete the deployment of the ALSEP
package.
After a third eating and sleeping period, the crew made their third and last
lunar excursion. This time the route took them along Hadley Rille for some
spectacular vistas and a chance to collect samples from what is believed to be
lunar bedrock. The total distance traveled during all three EVAs was 28 km,
and the rover was driven at a maximum speed of 12 km/h. A total of 83 kg
(183 lb) of Moon rock was collected and nearly 3. 2 km (2 mi) of film was
exposed.
It was less than four hours after the third EVA when the Lunar Module
blasted off the lunar surface to rejoin the orbiting CSM. The liftoff was wit-
nessed on Earth via the LCRU and its associated TV camera. Rendezvous and
docking were normal and all lunar samples were transferred to the CSM.
During a pressure check prior to LM jettison, a leak was detected in the LM/
CSM tunnel. Removal and inspection of the hatch disclosed no reason for the
leak, and on reinstallation the leak was gone. The pressure check was con-
tinued for over an hour, and the LM was finally jettisoned on revolution 52,
one orbit later than planned. The LM was maneuvered to a crash on the Moon
for another calibration of the three seismometers. Crash occurred at coordi-
nates 26. 361970N and 0. 25345 0 E, 92. 6 km (50 nmi) from the Apollo 15 site.
The CSM remained in lunar orbit almost two days longer conducting orbital
science experiments with emphasis on the SIM bay experiments. This extended
lunar orbit stay is another Apollo "first" in keeping with the science goals of
the "J" type mission. The film packages from the SIM bay cameras were
retrieved by the Command Module Pilot who took a "spacewalk" during trans-
earth cruise. Shortly before transearth injection, the crew released a Particle
and Field Subsatellite (P&FS) into an orbit of 139 by 100 km (75. 1 by 57. 3 nmi)
at an inclination of 151.3 degrees. The subsatellite has a coherent S-band
transponder for lunar mass concentration (mascon) studies at JPL. 1
1W. L. Sjogren, principal investigator
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The accuracy of transearth injection (TEI) was such that only one short
midcourse burn was required shortly before Earth atmosphere entry. Apollo 15
landed at approximately 26 0 4'N and 1580 4. 5'W some 480 km (300 mi) north of
Hawaii.
Table 3-1 shows the mission event times and Table 3-2 gives a summary of
television coverage.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DSN SUPPORT OF APOLLO 15.
1. DSN 26-m Antenna Stations.
As was done with previous Apollo lunar missions, DSS 11, 42, and 61
were committed to support Apollo 15 under direct MSFN/MSC control. The
responsibilities at these stations have changed, however.
Previously, the stations had two control rooms or "wings," one MSFN and
one DSN, and a set of common equipment, including antenna, servo, micro-
wave, masers, and power amplifiers, with a complicated switch to select the
control room to be connected to the common equipment. To avoid needless
construction, the DSN wing was designated to be the control room for the new
64-m antennas now being built adjoining DSS 42 and 61. All equipment to operate
the 26-m antenna in either DSN or MSFN mode was moved into what had been
called the MSFN wing, and the DSN, with MSFN concurrence, assumed respon-
sibility for maintenance and operations of the entire station. DSS 11 was simi-
larly configured to maintain network standardization.
In order to support the increased DSN responsibilities at these stations,
the DSIF insisted on a dedicated voice line to each station during its tracking
period. The line was for use only if the station had a problem and needed
immediate assistance from the SFOF. No routine traffic was to appear on this
line. In addition, the existing voice line from the DSN Operations Chief to the
MSFN Operations Chief was extended at each end to allow the DSIF Operations
Advisor to talk directly to the MSFN Network Support Team.
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Table 3-1. Apollo 15 Sequence of Major Events
Ground Greenwich Ground Greenwich
Event elapsed time, Mean Time, Event elapsed time, Mean Time,
h:min:s h:min:s h:min:s h:min:s
Launch 00:00:00 Jul 26/13:34:01 End EVA 1 126:14:00 Jul 31/19:48:01
TLI ignition 02:49:48 Jul 26/16:23:49 Bistatic radar begin (Rev 28) 131:42:37 Aug 01/01:16:38
TLI cutoff 02:55:35 Jul 26/16:29:36 Bistatic radar end 132:54:40 Aug 01/02:28:41
First midcourse (TLI + 9 h) Deleted Begin EVA 2 142:14:17 Aug 01/11:48:18
Second midcourse (TLI + 27 h) 28:40:00 Jul 27/18:14:01 End EVA 2 149:27:09 Aug 01/19:01:10
Third midcourse (LOI - 22 h) Deleted Begin EVA 3 163:18:00 Aug 02/08:52:01
Begin bistatic frequency 60:36:00 Jul 29/02:10:01
CSM plqne change 165:12:50 Aug 02/10:46:51
measurement
End bistatic frequency 60:43:00 Jul 29/02:17:01 End EVA 3 168:08:00 Aug 02/13:42:01
measurement LM ascent 171:37:22 Aug 02/17:11:23
Fourth midcourse (LOI - 5 h) 73:31:14 Jul 29/15:05:15 CSM/LM docking 173:36:00 Aug 02/19:10:01
SIM door jettison 74:06:14 Jul 29/15:40:15 LM jettison 179:30:00 Aug 03/01:04:01
LOI 78:31:46 Jul 29/20:05:47 LM separation 179:50:00 Aug 03/01:24:01
S-IVB impact 79:24:41 Jul 29/20:58:42 LM deorbit burn 181:04:19 Aug 03/02:38:20
DOI 82:39:48 Jul 30/00:13:49 LM crash 181:29:35 Aug 03/03:03:36
DOI trim 95:56:43 Jul 30/13:30:44 CSM shaping burn 221:20:47 Aug 04/18:54:48
Undock 100:13:30 Jul 30/17:47:31 P&FS deploy 222:39:36 Aug 04/20:13:37
CSM circularization 101:38:50 Jul 30/19:12:51 P&FS signal received 222:55:00 Aug 04/20:29:01
Powered descent initiation 104:30:09 Jul 30/22:04:10 TEl 223:48:45 Aug 04/21:22:46
Touchdown 104:42:29 Jul 30/22:16:30 Deleted
Fifth midcourse (TEl + 15 h) Deleted
Bcgin SEvA 106:A 2.00 J: ! 31/00:16:01 Begin CSM EVA 241:56:58 Aug 05/15:30:59
End SEVA 107:16:00 Jul 31/00:50:01 End CSM EVA 242:36:15 Aug 05/16:10:16
Bistatic radar begin (Rev 17) 110:02:45 Jul 31/03:36:46
Sixth midcourse (Entry - 22 h) Deleted
Bistatic radar end 111:15:21 Jul 31/04:49:22
Seventh midcourse (Entry - 3 h) 291:58:00 Aug 07/17:32:01
Begin EVA 1 119:39:40 Jul 31/13:13:41
ALSEP transmitter activated 125:03:00 Jul 31/18:37:01 Splashdown 295:11:53 Aug 07/20:45:54
Table 3-2. Apollo 15 Television
GMT, h:min GET, h:min Duration, h:min Subject Vehicle Station
Jul 26/17:01 03:27 00:08 Transposition and docking CSM GDS
Jul 28/00:29 34:55 00:51 Interior and transfer to tM CSM GDS
Jul 30/12:28" 94:54 00:15 Landing site CSM MAD
Jul 31/13:34" 120:00 a  0 6 :00b EVA-I LM/LCRU HSK/MAD
Aug 01/11:54 a  142:203 0 6 :3 0
b  EVA-2 LCRU PKS/HSK/MAD
Aug 02/09:04a  163:30' 04 :3 0b EVA-3 LCRU PKS/HSK/MAD
Aug 02/17:04 171:30 00:15 LM liftoff LCRU PKS/HSK/MAD
Aug 02/19:00 173:26 00:13 Rendezvous and docking CSM MAD
Aug 04/08:57 211:23 00:07 Surface TV LCRU MARS
Aug 05/15:24 241:50 01:00 Transearth EVA CSM HSK
Aug 06/19:56 270:22 00:52 Press conference and eclipse CSM MAD
"Approximate times.
blntermittent coverage.
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A new requirement on the Z6-m stations was for the reception of the LCRU
downlink at 2265.5 MHz, lower in frequency than any previously received
Apollo signals. The uplink was on the same frequency as the LM uplink. The
P&FS was also to be tracked, but this presented no problem since the uplink
and downlink frequencies are the same as the LM.
In view of past problems with transmitter tripoffs, the DSN was required
to modify its battleshort function at DSS 11, 42, and 61. The modification left
only one interlock, the arc detector, in operation. No other personnel safety
or equipment interlocks will function when the battleshort is engaged. The
battleshort is used during brief, mission-critical events, such as LM touch-
down, when loss of uplink is very undesirable. In the event of a false interlock,
there would be no interruption of the uplink. If the interlock is genuine, how-
ever, the power amplifier or its power supply would probably be destroyed and
be unavailable for the remainder of the mission. Without the battleshort,
interlock tripoffs are usually cleared rapidly, losing only a few seconds of
uplink lock. Thus, an agonizing tradeoff must be made over use of the
battleshort.
2. DSS 14.
The Mars station, DSS 14, was required to receive voice, telemetry,
biomedical, and TV, and relay the data to the Goldstone Prime MSFN station
(GDS). Specific requirements existed for low lunar orbits, touchdown, EVA
television, and LM crash. Coverage was also desired for television during
translunar coast.
3. Precision Doppler Data.
As part of a continuing study of lunar potential anomalies (mascons),
DSS 14 was required to provide precision high-speed doppler recordings of the
CSM and LM during low lunar orbits and of the LM during the descent phase
and later during the crash. In cooperation with the principal experimenter for
this JPL study, a set of internal DSN requirements was developed to make use
of the high-resolution doppler data available from DSN stations equipped with
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doppler resolvers. Four passes at DSS 51 were scheduled for this purpose.
DSS 51 was made available by tracking Mariner Mars 1971 from DSS 62. This
was fortunate because the Moon was at a low declination, and DSS 51 had long
view periods. Additionally, the desired doppler was recorded at DSS 14 during
the passes that had previously been scheduled for official Apollo support.
A related Apollo requirement was for high-speed strip-chart recordings of
DSS 14 received signal level during orbit 3 of the CSM and the crash of the LM.
4. Bistatic Radar Experiment.
DSS 14 was required to conduct another bistatic radar experiment as
had been done during Apollo 14. The requirements had been expanded to encom-
pass two orbits, 17 and 28, in place of the one orbit on Apollo 14. The experi-
ment consists of receiving the CSM downlink signal, which has been reflected
from the lunar surface, at DSS 14 in two orthogonal polarizations simultaneously.
From the recorded signal characteristics deductions can be made as to the nature
of the lunar soil.
5. ALSEP Support.
The ALSEP transmissions are usually supported by the 9-m (30-ft)
antennas of the MSFN. DSN support was requested during Apollo 14 because
the ALSEP on that mission occasionally transmitted at a high bit rate (10.6 kilo-
bits per second) and the 26-m stations provided the necessary signal-to-noise
ratio. During testing for that mission, it was found that the ALSEP uplink
frequency of 2119 MHz was so far removed from the normal DSN and Apollo
uplink frequencies as to require retuning of the klystron tubes in the ground
transmitters. This retuning significantly increases the chances for internal
klystron failure and caused some concern. Accordingly, before Apollo 15
(whose ALSEP had no high bit rate), the DSN voiced its concern to the MSFN.
After consultation with NASA Headquarters, it was decided that the DSN would
continue with ALSEP uplink testing and operations regardless of the mission
risks.
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6. LCRU.
Shortly before the mission the Apollo Project requested short tracks of
the LCRU from DSS 14 on August 4, 5, 7, and 8. The plan was to conduct tele-
vision surveys of the landing site after the astronauts had departed. The LCRU
batteries were expected to last approximately one week. Since this activity is
not intimately related to manned flight support, a ruling was requested from
NASA Headquarters on the relationship between the LCRU after LM liftoff and
the other unmanned mission support of the DSN. The approval was received
and the requested tracking was scheduled by cancelling some DSS 14 support of
other projects.
C. PREMISSION PREPARATIONS AND TESTING.
1. DSN 26-m Antenna Stations.
Although the requirement to support LCRU transmissions has been
known for some time, final testing of the support capability took place in early
1971 and continued until shortly before launch. The concern centered around
reception of the LCRU frequency of 2265. 5 MHz, below the normal Apollo band.
Wideband masers had been installed at DSS 42 and LCRU reception there proved
to be no problem. DSS 11 and 61 had not yet received the new masers, and the
bandwidth of the old maser was not sufficient to cover both Apollo and the
LCRU. The final procedure developed through this testing was to tune one
maser at each site to the lower half of the band and the other maser to the
upper half. There was no redundancy in this configuration as retuning required
60 minutes. In addition, the output of only one maser at a time could be selec-
ted, though this selection could be changed rapidly. A similar configuration
was used at DSS 14 where the masers are different but have a similar bandwidth
problem. As the LCRU link is marginal from a signal strength standpoint and
is critically affected by a steep gain slope, several tests were necessary to
demonstrate compatibility. Before Apollo 16, the new wideband masers will
be installed at DSS 11, 14, and 61.
32 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III
Soon after the DSS 11 reconfiguration was completed in early June 1971,
power amplifier (PA) number 3 began to experience interlock tripoffs. Repeated
testing and extensive component replacement (even replacement of the entire
power supply) failed to improve the reliability. During the two weeks before
launch, DSS 11 was reported "Red" due to the intermittent faults. This unrelia-
bility continued through the mission period.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 were placed under configuration control for the Apollo 15
mission as of 00:01 GMT on July 16, 1971, and were placed on mission status by
the MSFN as of 00:01 GMT on July 15, 1971. On previous missions, scheduling
control of these stations reverted to the MSFN during the mission status period.
In view of the increased DSN responsibilities at these stations for Apollo 15 and
beyond, the DSN planned to retain scheduling control, and the DSN/MSFN Opera-
ting Interface Procedures document reflected this plan. The MSFN, based on
alleged verbal agreements, assumed that scheduling would be done by the MSFN
as in the past. Accordingly, on July 15, the stations began to receive conflict-
ing scheduling messages from both the DSN and MSFN. After several days of
negotiation, MSFN scheduling was assigned control as a temporary expedient.
It was later decided that on Apollo 16 these stations must be scheduled by the
DSN.
2. DSS 14.
DSS 14 conducted the normal premission tests including installation and
tests of the bistatic radar experiment equipment as shown in Table 3-3. No
scheduling problems were experienced with DSS 14 as scheduling control for the
station has always been retained by the DSN.
3. DSN Predicts.
Antenna pointing information for DSS 11, 42, and 61 comes directly
from Houston in the form of a 29-point acquisition message. This message
also serves DSS 14 but has been considered a backup to SFOF-generated pre-
dicts. On Apollo 15 the 2 9-point message was declared the prime source of
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predicts for DSS 14. The SFOF continued to supply predicts, but as a backup
source only. Both predict systems were tested before the mission. The
29-point system worked perfectly, but the SFOF had some minor software prob-
lems. The predicts are generated by entering a Houston-supplied state vector
into the 1108 computer where the Double Precision Trajectory Program outputs
a probe ephemeris tape. The tape is carried to the IBM 360/75 for processing
by the predicts program. The predicts are transmitted directly by the 360.
Unfortunately, both computers are undergoing a series of software updates, and
with each update the interface compatibility can break down. Only a few days
before launch the trajectory program in the 1108 was modified and it was neces-
sary to add a small reformatting program to the 360 to make the data from the
probe ephemeris tape compatible with the predicts program. With this last-
minute modification the predicts procedure was tested and declared "Green" for
launch.
D. APOLLO 15 OPERATIONS.
1. DSN 26-m Antenna Stations.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 successfully supported all phases of the Apollo 15
mission. The problems experienced are noted in Table 3-4. As can be seen,
the problems with DSS 11 transmitter number 3 continued. Three tripoffs of
this transmitter were experienced during actual uplinking to the spacecraft.
After the third tripoff, mission control in Houston finally acquiesced to DSN
pleas (which began before launch) and declared DSS 11 transmitter number 4 as
prime. After that decision there were no further uplink losses at DSS 11.
During the first pass at Goldstone shortly after TLI, the spacecraft view
angles were beyond the antenna gimbal limits at the Goldstone Prime MSFN
stations. Therefore, DSS 11 was required to transmit simultaneously on sepa-
rate frequencies to the CSM and the instrument unit of the S-IVB booster.
Although this capability has existed for the entire Apollo program, this is the
first time that the capability has actually been used at a DSN station.
The 26-m stations tracked ALSEP several times but were never called
upon to transmit the ALSEP uplink signal.
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Table 3-3. DSS 14 Tests
Date,719 7 1  GMT, h:min Test
Jul 07 14:00-22:00 Bistatic cable installation
Jul 14 Configuration verification test
Jul 18 01:00-01:00 DSS 14/GDS prime data flow test
Jul 22 09:00-13:00 Bistatic countdown
Jul 22 13:00-20:00 Bistatic test
Table 3-4. Apollo 15 Tracking
DSS GMT, h:min Problems
11 Jul 26/16:35-05:38 None.
Jul 27/19:55-02:50 PA 3 fault at 23:21. One way
for 48 s due to erroneous
instructions from Prime.
Released from track early
for troubleshooting.
Jul 28/20:17-05:50 PA 3 fault at 03:26. Uplink lost
for 14 s. High-voltage power
supply from DSS 14 installed
after pass.
Jul 29/20:22-05:39 PA 3 fault at 03:21. Uplink lost
for 20 s.
Jul 30/21:39-06:45 PA 3 fault at 02:42 (was in
standby).
Jul 31/22:22-06:19 None.
Aug 01/23:31-07:55 None.
Aug 03/00:30-08:44 PA 3 fault at 12:30 on Aug 2
(station inactive).
Aug 04/02:06-09:10 PA 3 fault at 03:30 (was in
standby).
Aug 05/02:02-10:17 Glitches on HA error voltages.
No impact because station
autotracking. Problem not
repeatable.
Aug 06/02:21-09:59 None.
Aug 07/03:04-09:59 PA 3 fault at 04:36. Wrong
TLM bandwidth while tracking
subsatellite.
14 Jul 27/02:17-05:14 None.
Jul 28/01:24-05:35 None.
Jul 28/23:02-05:40 None.
Jul 29/20:29-05:39 None.
Jul 30/21:39-06:19 None.
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Table 3-4. Apollo 15 Tracking (cont'd)
DSS GMT, h:min Problems
14 Jul 31/22:29-06:19 Antenna pointing 0.2 deg off
(contd) boresight for first 10 min of
lunar revolution 28.
Aug 03/00:30-03:35 Failed to switch to high doppler
sample rate until 16 min after
LM jettison.
Aug 04/08:51-09:40 None (LCRU track).
Aug 05/04:00-06:30 None (LCRU search).
42 Jul 27/01:00-13:00 None.
Jul 28/01:08-13:31 None.
Jul 29/01:22-13:41 None.
Jul 30/01:18-14:23 None.
Jul 31/01:54-14:41 None.
Aug 01/03:14-16:16 None.
Aug 02/03:18-17:14 None.
Aug 03/04:26-17:28 None.
Aug 04/06:02-19:06 None.
Aug 05/05:29-19:14 Heat exchanger problem on
standby PA.
Aug 06/05:50-19:25 None.
Aug 07/06:11-20:26 None.
51 Jul 30/10:17-22:18 Failed to take required dipp!cr
data for four of six lunar
orbits.
Jul 31/11:30-22:34 None.
Aug 03/13:20-01:16 None.
Aug 04/14:18-21:04 None.
61 Jul 26/09:32-21:19 Bad ranging readouts on
System 3; replaced faulty
cord.
Jul 27/12:21-21:56 None.
Jul 28/12:51-22:06 None.
Jul 29/13:01-21:55 None.
Jul 30/14:04-22:38 None.
Jul 31/15:26-22:33 Pretrack ranging problem;
repaired before track.
Aug 01/15:53-23:43 None.
Aug 02/16:53-23:45 Wrong character in Tracking
Data Processor header.
Aug 03/18:16-01:21 None.
Aug 04/18:34-02:22 None.
Aug 05/18:58-02:23 None.
Aug 06/19:28-02:30 None.
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2. DSS 14.
Seven Apollo passes were tracked as shown in Table 3-4. The station
also tracked the LCRU twice. The station had originally been scheduled for
four LCRU tracks, but after failure of the LCRU at the end of the first pass and
a futile attempt at revival on the second pass, DSS 14 was released from further
support.
DSS 14 supported the bistatic radar experiment as planned. The experiment
was somewhat degraded during lunar revolution 17 because the spacecraft had
been pitched the wrong direction, making the radiation toward the lunar surface
elliptical rather than circular. Revolution 28 efforts produced good data, and
was not noticeably degraded by the operator error which resulted in a brief
mispointing of the antenna.
DSS 14 failed to switch to high doppler sampling rate upon LM jettison as
required. LM jettison occurred at a nonstandard time, and 16 minutes passed
before the station was advised of the event. A verbal mark will be requested
from the MSFN if future missions have event-related requirements such as this.
3. DSS 51.
DSS 51 tracked Apollo on four days as shown in Table 3-4. Apparently
the station was not familiar with the Apollo requirements and took doppler
samples at a one-minute rate instead of a one-second rate during part of the
first pass. Unfortunately, the one-second samples were of high priority, since
the spacecraft was in a very low lunar orbit at the time. The remainder of the
doppler data on pass number 1 and subsequent passes was successfully recorded
as required.
4. Predict Operations.
The 2 9-point acquisition message, which was the prime source of
predicts for DSS 14, was used with no problems. The messages occasionally
arrived later than desired, but the station was never completely without
predicts.
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In the SFOF, eight sets of predicts were generated during the mission and
transmitted to DSS 14. One set of preflight nominal landing site predicts was
generated and transmitted before the mission to DSS 14 and 51. No problems
occurred in supplying the scheduled stations with predicts.
5. GCF Participation.
The DSN GCF provided voice, teletype, and high-speed data circuits to
support the DSN Apollo operations. In addition, JPL acts as West Coast
Switching Center for the NASA Communications Network and handles many non-
DSN circuits in support of Apollo. There were no known GCF anomalies and
GCF support was considered excellent. The voice lines that were scheduled to
each 26-m station were used only once.
6. SFOF Participation.
The SFOF areas and equipment used for Apollo 15 included the
Operations Area, the Network Analysis Area, the Mariner Mars 1971 computer
terminal area, the Univac 1108, and IBM 360/75 computers. The SFOF support
is limited to predict generation, tracking data reception, and some off-line
monitoring. The only SFOF problems were in the software area. In addition
to the predict software problems, the 360 computer was unable to receive
Apollo tracking data when tracking data from Mariner Mars 1971 was also
being received. Therefore, the Apollo data had to be manually recalled from
the GCF Communications Processor during inactive periods of Mariner Mars
1971. Other than these software problems, SFOF support was excellent.
38 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III
SECTION IV
THE APOLLO 16 MISSION
A. MISSION DESCRIPTION.
Apollo 16, the ninth manned Apollo spacecraft flown above the three-stage
Saturn V launch vehicle, carried astronauts John Young (Commander), Charles
Duke (Lunar Module Pilot), and Ken Mattingly (Command Module Pilot). The
mission goal was exploration of the Descartes highland region of the Moon. A
secondary goal was to collect scientific data while in an extended lunar-orbit
phase.
Launch from Cape Kennedy Pad 39A occurred at 17:54:00.65 GMT on
April 16, 1972, at a launch azimuth of 72.03 degrees. Translunar injection
(T LI) over the Pacific Ocean occurred midway through the second revolution
in the Earth parking orbit with a 5-minute, 46-second burn of the S-IVB stage
engine. Following TLI, the Command Service Module (CSM) separated from
the booster, docked with the unattended Lunar Module (LM), and extracted the
LM from the S-IVB. The S-IVB was directed by ground command to crash on
the Moon as an additional calibration of the seismometers left there by the
Apollo 12, 14, and 15 missions. Unfortunately, an abnormal venting of helium
gas from a stuck regulator caused trajectory disturbances, and the radio system
on the S-IVB quit abruptly at 21:03:58 GMT on April 17, preventing an accurate
determination of the crash location. The best estimate is that the crash
occurred at 21:01:04 GMT on April 19 at lunar coordinates 1.83 0 N and 23.3 0W,
approximately 280 km northeast of the targeted location.
Midcourse correction 1 was deleted due to the accuracy of the TLI man-
euver. Midcourse correction 2 was a short 2. 1-second burn of the Service
Propulsion System (SPS) for a 3.81-m/sec (12.5 ft/sec) velocity change, which
lowered the upcoming perilune from 216 km (117 nmi) to 133 km (71.7 nmi),
within 0. 5 km of the planned height. Midcourse corrections 3 and 4 were not
required. During translunar cruise, the astronauts entered the LM twice to
activate its radio system, allowing telemetry reception on Earth. The crew
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also worked at solving several minor problems, including an intermittent
monitor on the television camera, a leaking water chlorinator, and a suspected
gimbal lock on the Inertial Measurement Unit. The latter problem was resolved
as being a false warning indication caused by an electrical transient.
Shortly before entering lunar orbit, the astronauts jettisoned a door cover-
ing the Scientific Instruments Module (SIM) of the Service Module. The SIM
bay carries scientific instruments for observation of the Moon from lunar orbit.
The instruments include a gamma ray spectrometer developed at JPL, an X-ray
spectrometer, an alpha particle spectrometer, a mass spectrometer, a laser
altimeter, a mapping camera, and a panoramic camera.
A successful lunar orbit insertion (LOI) burn of 374.3 seconds, for a
velocity change of 854 m/sec (2802 ft/sec), put the spacecraft into a 316- x
108-km (170.3- x 58. 1-nmi) orbit. Two orbits later, a descent orbit insertion
(DOI) burn lowered the spacecraft to a 107. 5- x 20. 2-km (58. 5- x 10. 9-nmi)
orbit.
During lunar orbit 12, the CSM and LM separated, with astronauts Young
and Duke in the LM preparing for descent to the lunar surface on orbit 13.
When communication was re-established at the beginning of orbit 13, it was
learned that the CSM had not executed a circularization burn that should have
been completed while behind the Moon. During the checkout for the burn, a
rate feedback signal was absent, and the engine gimbal position indicator
showed yaw oscillations. Preparations for LM landing were immediately
halted, and the two spacecraft went into formation flight, prepared to dock and
use the LM as a "lifeboat, " as on Apollo 13, should the malfunction be serious
and the backup system also become inoperative. Considerable resources were
quickly gathered on the ground to study and simulate the problem. Within
several hours, a decision was made to continue the mission and to use the
backup SPS gimbal system for all SPS burns. The decision was based on the
finding that, if the backup system were lost, the oscillating engine gimbal
would still allow a desired maneuver to be safely, albeit crudely, executed.
The delay, however, caused considerable modification to the rest of the
mission.
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The landing was planned for orbit 16, and this time the CSM came from
behind the Moon in the proper circular orbit. The descent phase was normal,
except that the LM high-gain steerable antenna, a perennial trouble source,
was malfunctioning, and the LM was forced to transmit using its omni-antenna.
The low signal levels caused data dropouts at all stations except DSS 14, the
64-m-antenna station of the DSN. Landing took place at 8054'S and 15 0 30'E,
only 262 m northwest of the planned site.
The original flight plan anticipated extravehicular activity (EVA) shortly
after landing, but, because of the delayed landing, a sleep period was scheduled
before the EVA. During the first EVA period, the astronauts deployed the lunar
rover. As on Apollo 15, there were initially some problems with the rover; in
this case, the rear steering was inoperative, but it later corrected itself. The
astronauts set up the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP),
which contained a seismometer and several fields-and-particles experiments.
Unfortunately, the commander tripped over the cable leading to an experiment
designed to measure the flow of heat from the interior of the Moon. The cable
was so severely damaged that repair was impractical, and the experiment was
lost. The ALSEP transmitter was activated, and stations with 9-m (30-ft)
antennas were reporting steady signal levels of -139 dBm. The crew also
made one traverse using the rover.
After a sleep period, the crew began the second EVA, which consisted of
several traverses primarily for geological exploration. Adjustments were also
made to the ALSEP instruments. The rover navigation system experienced a
partial failure, but it was not considered necessary for normal range traverses.
After another sleep period, the crew conducted a third EVA, which was of
shorter duration than the others. In addition to the geological exploration
traverses, a "grand prix" exercise was conducted, with the rover operating at
high speeds and making sharp turns to evaluate rover capabilities and the effect
of the lunar soil upon maneuverability. At the end of the third EVA, the rover
had traveled a total of 27. 1 kmin, and the astronauts had collected approximately
97 kg (213 lb) of rocks.
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Some 4 hours after the third EVA, the LM blasted off the lunar surface to
rejoin the orbiting CSM. The liftoff was observed on Earth via the television
camera on the rover. Rendezvous and docking were normal, except that tele-
vision coverage was deleted. Television transmission requires the CSM to
maintain a high S-band radiated power level, and the LM radiated power level
was low due to the unusable high-gain antenna. Earlier in the mission, the
strong CSM signal had interfered with the weak LM signal when received at
DSS 14, and the television coverage was cancelled to insure high-quality LM
data reception.
The original flight plan called for the LM to be jettisoned 4 hours after
docking and for the CSM to conduct orbital science experiments for another
47 hours. Because of lingering concern for the SPS engine, the LM was
retained until shortly before trans-Earth injection (TEI), and the duration of
the orbital operations was reduced to approximately 22 hours. These changes
caused the bistatic radar experiment to be reduced from two orbits (numbers
26 and 66) to one orbit (number 40). The planners also cancelled a CSM orbit-
shaping burn that was necessary for the Particles-and-Fields Subsatellite
(P&FS) to be released into a long-lifetime orbit. The P&FS, which had a
planned lifetime of more than 1 year, crashed on the Moon on May 29, 1972,
only 35 days after release.
The LM was jettisoned 5 hours before TEI. Unfortunately, an attitude-
control switch had been left in the wrong position, and the LM began to tumble
at a rate of 3 degrees/second. Without attitude control, it was impossible to
conduct the de-orbit burn for the planned lunar impact and the calibration of
the ALSEP seismometers. Therefore, the LM remains in a lunar orbit that
will eventually (early 1973) degrade, resulting in an unobserved lunar impact.
The transmitter on the LM ceased due to battery depletion at 13:05:40 GMT on
April 25 during lunar orbit 70.
The TEI maneuver, despite concerns over the SPS engine, was highly
accurate, and midcourse correction 5 was a short burn for only a 1.04-m/sec
(3.4 ft/sec) velocity change. An EVA was conducted during trans-Earth cruise
to retrieve exposed film and other scientific materials from the SIM bay.
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Apollo 16 landed at 0°44'S and 156 0 1Z'W in the Pacific Ocean, approximately
300 km southeast of Christmas Island.
Table 4-1 shows the mission event times. The term "ground elapsed time"
(GET) is actually a misnomer since the GET clocks were readjusted twice
during the mission: First, the GET clock was advanced 11 minutes, 48 seconds
at 16:30 GMT on April 21; then, the clock was advanced 24 hours, 34 minutes,
12 seconds at 04:08:01 GMT on April 25. These changes caused the GET of the
mission events to correspond to the GET indicated in the flight plan, in spite of
the delays caused by the SPS problems.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DSN SUPPORT.
1. 26-m Antenna Stations.
As was done with previous Apollo missions, DSS 11, 42, and 61 were
committed to support Apollo 16 under direct STDN/MSC (Manned Spacecraft
Center) control. Their responsibilities included two-way tracking of the CSM,
LM, S-IVB, and Lunar Communications Relay Unit (LCRU), which transmits
on a frequency of 2265. 5 MHz and receives on the LM uplink frequency. The
P&FS was also to be tracked, but was not to be activated until after LM impact,
since the uplink and downlink frequencies for the two vehicles are identical.
Unlike previous Apollo missions, scheduling authority for the 26-m-antenna
stations was retained by the DSN for the entire Apollo 16 mission. This change
was necessary because the DSN had assumed complete maintenance and opera-
tions responsibility for these 26-m-antenna stations.
2. DSS 14.
The Mars station (DSS 14) was required to receive voice, telemetry,
biomedical, and television data and to relay the data to the Goldstone prime
STDN station (GDS). Specific requirements existed for low lunar orbit, touch-
down, EVA television, and LM crash. Coverage was also desired for television
during translunar coast.
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Table 4-1. Apollo 16 Sequence of Major Events
Ground Actual
elapsed elapsed Date/GreenwichEvent time, time, mean time,
hr:min:scc hr:min:sec hr:min:sec
Launch 00:00:00 00:00:00 April 16/17:54:01
TLI ignition 02:33:34 02:33:34 April 16/20:27:35
TLI cutoff 02:39:20 02:39:20 April 10/20:33:21
First midcourse - - -
(deleted)
Second midcourse 30:39:00 30:39:00 April 18/00:33:01
LM comm test 33:00:00 33:00:00 April 18/02:54:01
Third midcourse - - -
(deleted)
LM comm test 53:31:00 53:31:00 April 18/23:25:01
Bistatic frequency 57:19:39 57:19:39 April 19/03:13:40
check
Fourth midcourse - -
(deleted)
SIM door jettison 69:59:00 69:59:00 April 19/15:53:01
LOI 74:28:27 74:28:27 April 19/20:22:28
S-IVB impact 75:07:03 75:07:03 April 19/21:01:04
DOI 78:33:44 78:33:44 April 20/00:27:45
Separation 96:13:31 96:13:31 April 20/18:07:32
Second separation 102:30:00 102:30:00 April 21/00:24:0J
Power descent 104:17:25 104:17:25 April 21/02:11:26
initiation
Touchdown 104:29:35 104:29:35 April 21/02:23:36
Begin EVA 1 119:05:48 118:54:00 April 21/16:48:01
End EVA1 126:16:48 126:05:00 April 21/2,3:59:01
Begin EVA 2 142:51:15 142:39:27 April 22/16:33:28
End EVA 2 150:14:41 150:02:53 April 22/23:56:54
Bistatic radar 151:28:21 151:16:33 April 23/01:10:34
begin (orbit 40)
Bistatic radar end 152:41:15 152:29:27 April 23/02:23:28
Begin EVA 3 165:43:11 165:31:23 April 23/15:25:24
CSM orbit change 169:28:48 169:17:00 April 23/19:11:01
End EVA 3 171:23:29 171:11:41 April 23/21:05:42
LM ascent 175:43:35 175:31:47 April 24/01:25:48
Docking 177:51:48 177:40:00 April 24/03:34:01
LM jettison 195:12:00 190:00:12 April 24/20:54:13
Lunar orbit plane - -
change (deleted)
P&FS launch 196:13:55 196:02:07 April 24/21:56:08
TEl 200:33:20 200:21:32 April 25/02:15:33
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Table 4-1. Apollo 16 Sequence of Major Events (cont'd)
Ground Actual
elapsed elapsed Date/GreenwichEvent time, time, mean time,
hr:min:sec hr:min:sec hr:min:scc
LM battery 235:57:39 211:11:39 April 25/13:05:40
depletion
Fifth midcourse 239:21:02 214:35:02 April 25/16:29:03
P&FS commanded 241:16:30 216:30:30 April 25/18:24:31
on
CSM EVA 243:35:00 218:49:00 April 25/20:43:01
Sixth midcourse - -
(deleted)
Seventh midcourse 287:22:00 262:36:00 April 27/16:30:01
Splashdown 290:37:06 265:51:06 April 27/19:45:07
3. Precision Doppler Data.
As part of a continuing study (based at JPL) of potential lunar anomalies
(mascons), DSS 14 was required to provide precision high-speed doppler record-
ings of the CSM and LM during low lunar orbits and of the LM during the descent
phase and later during the crash. The unexpected events during the mission
modified this requirement: First, the extra time spent in low lunar orbit while
the SPS engine problem was being studied provided considerable extra mascon
data; second, the lack of an LM crash relieved DSS 14 of the coverage require-
ment. A related Apollo requirement was for high-speed strip-chart recordings
of DSS 14 received signal strength during orbit 3 of the CSM and the crash of
the LM.
4. Bistatic Radar Experiment.
DSS 14 was required to conduct another bistatic radar experiment as
had been done on Apollos 14 and 15. The experiment was originally scheduled
for CSM orbits 26 and 66, but after the SPS problems the experiment was
rescheduled to the single orbit 40. The experiment consists of receiving the
CSM downlink signal, which has been reflected from the lunar surface, at
DSS 14 in two orthogonal polarizations simultaneously. From the recorded
signal characteristics, deductions can be made as to the nature of the lunar
soil.
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5. LCRU.
A very late requirement was imposed for additional DSS 14 tracking of
the LCRU after LM liftoff. The requirement, received on April 18 (during
translunar cruise), was for 10 short daily passes from April 25 through May 4
to receive television signals from the LCRU until its batteries were depleted.
Due to the unmanned, non-Apollo nature of the requirement and its severe
impact on DSS 14 tracking of unmanned spacecraft and radioscience objects,
the conflict was submitted to NASA Headquarters for resolution. The DSN was
subsequently instructed to schedule the LCRU tracking, regardless of the impact
on other activities. The LCRU was tracked daily until it ceased to operate on
April 30.
C. DSN PRE-MISSION PREPARATIONS AND TESTING.
1. .26-m Antenna Stations.
Because of power amplifier interlock tripoffs on past missions, the
DSN undertook a reliability study shortly after the Apollo 15 mission. This
study resulted in a mechanical redesign of the transmitter power supply. This
modification was made at each 2 6-m-antenna station before the Apollo 16 mis-
sion. In addition, a particularly troublesome power amplifier at DSS 11 was
completely replaced with a new unit direct from the manufacturer.
Between the Apollo 15 and 16 missions, the method of processing pointing
data at the stations was changed. Previously, the 29-point acquisition message
from the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) or the Manned Spacecraft Center
(MSC) was entered into an STDN Univac 1218 computer, where it was reformat-
ted for inputting to the Antenna Position Programmer (APP). After the
Apollo 15 mission, the Univac 1218 computer was removed, and a program
was written for the existing DSN Antenna Pointing System (APS) computer to
assume the reformatting function. The program was written using a specifica-
tion from GSFC, the DSN's official Apollo contact, and the program operated
perfectly when tested with GSFC.
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Shortly before the mission, testing began with MSC, and the program
developed serious problems. An investigation quickly revealed that MSC does
not transmit 2 9-point acquisition messages formatted according to the GSFC
specification; when an angle in the message is less than 10 degrees, GSFC fills
the unused digit position with a zero, whereas MSC fills the position with a
teletype space. MSC claimed that they would be unable to meet the specification
with the launch less than one week away.
During a worldwide conference call, DSS 61 operations personnel mentioned
that they had discovered that changes in only two computer words of the on-site
program would enable the program to accept either format. The modifications
were studied by the programmer at JPL and hastily tested at both DSS 61 and
DSS 42. The changes were found to be sound, and the modified program was
used during the mission. It is anticipated that the program will be rewritten
before the Apollo 17 mission to improve the input formatting and also to remove
several operator inconveniences discovered during testing.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 were placed under configuration control for the
Apollo 16 mission on April 4, 1972. They were placed on mission status by
the STDN on April 3.
2. DSS 14.
DSS 14 conducted normal pre-mission activities, including installation
and tests of the bistatic radar equipment, as shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2. DSS 14 Tests
Date/GMT, hr:min Test
April 4118:00-22:00 Countdown for bistatic test
April 4/22:00-24:00 Bistatic signal flow test
April 5/00:00-05:00 Bistatic final checkout
April 7 CVT/OVT
April 9, 10/06:16-05:25 Data flow test with GDS
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D. DSN OPERATIONS DURING MISSION.
1. 26-m Antenna Stations.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 successfully supported all phases of the Apollo 16
mission. The problems experienced are noted in Table 4-3. As can be seen,
there were no power amplifier overcurrent or arc detector tripoffs.
2. DSS 14.
Seven Apollo passes were tracked, as shown in Table 4-3. The station
also tracked six LCRU passes. The station had originally been scheduled for
ten LCRU tracks, but, on April 30, the signal could not be acquired, indicating
a dead LCRU battery.
DSS 14 experienced a pointing problem on the first pass, beginning shortly
after TLI. The spacecraft rose rapidly in the west, crossed the station merid-
ian at a high elevation, reversed its apparent motion, and again set in the west.
At the moment that the spacecraft crossed the station meridian going from west
to east, the Antenna Pointing System (APS) malfunctioned. At first it was
thought to be a predict problem, but post-mission study may show that the APS
correctly interpolates forward from an hour angle of 359 to 0, but not in
reverse. This is a unique problem because it is the first known spacecraft
track at DSS 14 to cross the meridian in a reverse direction.
A significant problem occurred on April 19 and 20. With the CSM and LM
both in the main beam of the DSS 14 antenna and the CSM and LM signal levels
at -92 and -115, respectively, the LM signal received interference that caused
an increased telemetry bit error rate. When the CSM signal was reduced, the
bit error rate returned to normal. Assuming that a maser overload was at
fault, DSS 14 switched masers and then retuned the backup maser. In so doing,
gain on the backup maser was lost, and the station switched back to the prime
maser. The immediate impact of the problem was to restrict the allowable
CSM signal level whenever it was in the vicinity of the LM. Therefore, it was
necessary to cancel the planned television coverage of the CSM-LM docking
48 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III
Table 4-3. Apollo 16 Tracking
Date/GMT, hr:min Problems Date/GNIT, hr:min Problems
DSS 11 DSS 42
April 16/20:44-06:47 PA3 beam voltage not controllable April 17/03:18-11:19 None
remotely April 18103:45-12:10
April 17/19:14-07:11 Defective iso-amp in system 3 ranging April 19/03:58-12:25
April 18/19:31-07:23 None April 20/04:52-13:09
April 19/19:18-07:48 None April 21/04:39-14:04
April 20j20:12-08:43 None April 22/05:25-14:26
April 21/21:30-08:30 PA3 and PA4 failed during pretrack April 23/05:29-16:03
tests. Caused by low flow through
combiner. Flow increased April 24/05:51-16:56
April 22/22:09-10:11 Pretrack ranging problem. Replaced April 25/06:01-17:14
relay April 26/05:59-17:23
April 23/23:06-09:53 None April 27/05:51-18:28
April 25/00:36-10:46 Defective exciter turning potentiom- DSS 61
eter on system 3
April 26/00:00-10:44 None April 17/10:31-21:04 None
April 27/00:18-10:19 None April 18/11:05-00:40
DSS 14 April 19/11:17-00:17
April 20/12:28-00:59
April 16/23:09-03:03 APS problems near zenith
April 21/13:36-00:42
April 17/23:11-07:56 None April 22/13:57-02:07
April 19/18:46-07:48 Distortion of LM signal when using
Mod 3 maser. Switched to PDS maser April 23/15:00-02:06
at 00:30Z. 3.5 min gap in predicts Aptil 24/16:42-03:05
April 20/20:04-08:58 Distortion of LM signal when using April 25/16:54-02:34
either maser. Tuning of backup maser April 26/16:35-02:27
caused loss of gain. Confusion over
too many predict sets (one set for
each mission contingency)
April 21/20:58-09:29 None
April 22/21:59-09:56 TDH doppler counter hung up
03:02-09:56Z
April 23/22:57-05:15 None
April 25/05:33-05:50 None (LCRU track)
April 26/06:25-06:46
April 27/06:10-06:54
April 28/06:24-06:45
April 29/07:26-07:59 None (LCRU track)
April 30/06:38-08:00 No LCRU signal received
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III 49
maneuvers. This interference was not experienced on past missions because
the LM usually transmits a high signal level using its high-gain steerable
antenna.
DSS 14 supported the bistatic radar experiment successfully. The experi-
ment was reduced from two lunar orbits to one orbit (number 40) because of the
other mission problems.
3. GCF Participation.
The GCF provided voice, teletype, and high-speed data circuits to
support the DSN Apollo operations. In addition, JPL acts as the west coast
switching center for the NASA Communications Network and handles many non-
DSN circuits in support of Apollo. There were no known GCF anomalies, and
GCF support was considered excellent.
4. SFOF Participation.
The SFOF areas and equipment used for the Apollo 16 mission included
the Operations Area, the Network Analysis Area, the Mariner computer ter-
minal area, and the Univac 1108 and IBM 360/75 computers. The SFOF sup-
port was limited to predict generation and some off-line monitoring. In contrast
to previous Apollo missions, no problems were experienced with predict genera-
tion. Fourteen Probe Ephemeris Tapes were generated on the Univac 1108,
and sixteen predict sets were generated for DSS 14 on the IBM 360/75. The
SFOF support was excellent.
50 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III
SECTION V
THE APOLLO 17 MISSION
A. MISSION DESCRIPTION.
Apollo 17, the tenth manned Apollo spacecraft flown above the three-
stage Saturn V launch vehicle, carried astronauts Eugene A. Cernan,
Commander (CDR), Ronald E. Evans, Command Module Pilot (CMP), and
Harrison H. Schmitt, a geologist by profession, Lunar Module Pilot (LMP).
The mission goal was exploration of the area around the Taurus Mountains and
Littrow Crater with the aim of filling in gaps in current knowledge of the moon
and its history.
Launch from Cape Kennedy Pad 39A occurred at 5:33:00. 83 GMT on
December 7, 1972, at launch azimuth of 92. 0 degrees. A countdown hold of
2 hours 40 minutes was required when the launch auto-sequencer failed to
pressurize a third stage LOX tank, and then failed to recognize that the launch
controllers had manually pressurized the tank after observing the discrepancy.
The sequencer was reprogrammed to overlook the one countdown step, and
the countdown proceeded normally. This was the first Apollo program launch
hold for technical reasons (Apollo 14 was held for weather). The launch was
the first Apollo launch to occur at night. The geometry of the Sun and moon
constrain a launch to one or two days in any month to allow acceptable Sun
lighting angles at the landing site during touchdown. During December, the
geometry was such that a daylight launch would have required the spacecraft
to spend many hours in the shadow of the Earth, causing an unacceptable
amount of spacecraft cooling. The trajectory of -the night launch avoided this
long duration in the shadow.
Due to the unusual launch time, translunar injection (TLI) occurred over
the Atlantic Ocean in the beginning of the third revolution in Earth parking
orbit (the customary TLI occurs over the Pacific Ocean in the second orbit).
A 5-minute 46-second burn of the S-IVB engine placed the spacecraft on a
translunar trajectory. Following TLI, the Command Service Module (CSM)
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III 51
separated from the booster and docked with the unattended Lunar Module (LM).
During docking, three of the docking latches did not lock. The crew manually
recocked and fired two of the problem latches and they seized properly,
completing an adequate docking. The CSM extracted the LM from the S-IVB,
and the S-IVB was directed by ground command to crash on the moon in a
seismic experiment involving the seismometers left there by the Apollo 12,
14, 15, and 16 missions. The S-IVB impacted the moon at 20:32:43 GMT on
December 10 at lunar coordinates 40 12' S, 120 18' W, approximately 160 km
northwest of the planned site.
Midcourse correction 1 was deleted due to the accuracy of the TLI
maneuvers. Midcourse correction 2 was a short 1.7 second burn of the
Service Propulsion System (SPS) for a velocity change of 3.0 m/s (9.9 ft/s)
and a trim of 0. 2 m/s (0.7 ft/s) with the Reaction Control System (RCS). Mid-
course corrections 3 and 4 were not required.
At 22:33 GMT on December 9, the ground elapsed time (GET) clocks were
advanced from 65:00 GET to 67:40 GET to compensate for the 2-hours 40-minute
delay in the launch. This time clock change, together with a faster translunar
trajectory, timed to speed up moon arrival by 2 hours 40 minutes, put the
mission back onto the original GMT/GET schedule. After this change, all
mission events occurred within minutes of the premission plan. Table 5-1
reflects both the GET times and the actual elapsed times (AET) of each event.
Several minor problems occurred during translunar cruise. Several
erroneous master alarms were observed in the spacecraft. The master alarm
system warns the astronauts when some measurement in the spacecraft is
found to be reaching an unusual value, but the master alarm was sounding
without reason. The alarm was by-passed during sleep periods to avoid
unnecessarily waking the astronauts. On December 9, mission control found
it impossible to wake the astronauts, and they overslept more than an hour.
As usual, only one astronaut (the CMP) was sleeping with his headset on, and the
the headset inadvertently fell off, leaving the crew out of contact with mission
control. In such a circumstance, Houston normally sends a master alarm
command to the spacecraft, setting off the warning signals. Since the master
52 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-452, Vol. III
1Table 5-1. Apollo 17 Sequence of Major Events
Event GET, AET, Date/CGMT, GET, AET, Date/GMT,o Event Eventh:min:s h:min:s h:min:s h:min:s h:min:s h:min:s
0 Launch 0:00:00 0:00:00 12- 7/05:33:01 CSM circularization 111:57:28 109:17:28 12-11/18:50:29
Insertion 0:11:47 0:11:47 12- 7/05:44:48 DOI-2 112:02:41 109:22:41 12-11/18:55:42
TLI ignition 3:12:35 3:12:35 12- 7/08:45:36 PDI 112:49:53 110:09:53 12-11/19:42:54
TLIcutoff 3:18:21 3:18:21 12- 7/08:51:22 Touchdown 113:01:58 110:21:58 12-11/19:54:59
O Transposition/ 3:43:00 3:43:00 12- 7/09:16:01 EVA 1 begin 117:01:36 114:21:36 12-11/23:54:37
docking ALSEP activated 120:00:31 117:20:31 12-12/02:53:32
CSM/LM eject 4:45:00 4:45:00 12- 7/10:18:01 EVA 1 end 124:13:47 121:33:47 12-12/07:06:48
S4B evasive 5:30:00 5:30:00 12- 7/11:03:01 EVA 2 begin 140:34:49 137:54:49 12-12/23:27:50
maneuvera EVA 2 end 148:12:10 145:32:10 12-13/07:05:11
S4B first mideourse a  6:36:00 6:36:00 12- 7/12:09:01S4Birstidurse 6:36:00 :3:00 1-7/12:09:01 EVA 3 begin 163:32:35 160:52:35 12-13/22:25:36First midcourse
* (deleted) EVA 3 end 170:48:06 168:08:06 12-14/05:41:07(e Lunar orbit planeN Second midcourse 35:29:59 35:29:59 12- 8/17:03:00 change 182:33:53 179:53:53 12-14/17:26:54
LM communication 41:16:00 41:16:00 12- 8/22:49:01 LM ascent 188:01:36 185:21:36 12-14/22:54:37
test begin0test begin CSM/LM docking 190:17:03 187:37:03 12-15/01:10:04LM communication 41:59:00 41:59:00 12- 8/2-:13:01
test end LM jettison 193:58:35 191:18:35 12-15/04:51:36
LM communication 60:12:00 60:12:00 12- 9/17:45:01 LM deorbit 195:38:13 192:58:13 12-15/06:31:14
test begin LM crash 195:57:18 193:17:18 12-15/06:50:19
LM communication 60:26:00 60:26:00 12- 9/17:59:01 TEI 236:42:08 234:02:08 12-16/23:35:09
test end Fifth midcourse
Third midcourse (deleted)
(deleted) CSM EVA begin 257:34:24 254:54:24 12-17/20:27:25
Fourth midcourse CSM EVA end 258:41:42 256:01:42 12-17/21:34:43
SIM door jettison 84:12:00 81:32:00 12-10/15:05:01 (deleted)
CSM first occultation 88:43:22 86:03:22 12-10/19:36:23
LOI 88:54:21 86:14:21 12-10/19:47:22 Seventhmidcoursea 801:18:00 298:38:00 12-19/16:11:01LOI 88:54:21 86:14:21 12-10/19:47:22
S4B impact 89:39:42 86:59:42 12-10/20:32:43 CM/SM separation 304:03:48 301:23:48 12-19/18:56:49
DOI 93:11:00 90:31:00 12-11/00:04:01 Entry interface 304:18:41 301:38:41 I2-19/19i11:42
Separation 110:27:55 107:47:55 12-11/17:20:56 Splashdown 304:31:58 301:51:58 12-19/19:24:59
aTime approximate.
Lo
alarm was disabled., the crew could not be reached, causing some concern
at mission control: without a master alarm, the crew might have slept through
a spacecraft emergency. Other problems included a pressure oscillation in a
hydrogen tank and several losses of communication; a 3-minute dropout at
60:55 GET caused by a ground problem at the Ascension STDN site; a 9-minute
dropout at 86:08 GET caused by a maser failure at the Madrid STDN site, and
a 4-minute delay in acquisition due to an antenna pointing problem at the Gold-
stone STDN site during the first lunar revolution, resulting in a rapid. handover
to DSS 11.
Shortly before entering lunar orbit, the astronauts jettisoned a door
covering the Scientific Instruments Module (SIM) of the Service Module. The
SIM bay carries scientific instruments for observation of the moon from
lunar orbit.
A successful lunar orbit insertion (LOI) burn of 6 minutes, 33 seconds,
for a velocity change of 911.32 m/s (2989.9 ft/s), put the spacecraft into
a 315.4x 97. 2 km (170.3 x 52.5 nmi) orbit. Two orbits later, a descent orbit
insertion (DOI) burn of 22 seconds for a velocity change of 60.41 m/s (198. 2 ft/s)
lowered the orbit to 109. 5 x 27. 6 km (59. 1 x 14. 9 nmi).
During lunar orbit 12, the CSM and LM separated, with astronauts Cernan
and Schmitt in the LM preparing for descent to the lunar surface on orbit 13.
A LM-only descent orbit burn (DOI-2) at 18:55:42 on December 11 placed the
LM into a 110. 4 x 11.5 km (59. 6 x 6. 2 nmi) orbit. Landing occurred at
19:54:59 GMT on December 11 at lunar coordinates 200 9' 50. 5" N and
300 46' 19.3" E, approximately 369 meters east of the planned landing site.
After a short eating period, the astronauts began extra-vehicular activity 1
(EVA1), during which they deployed the lunar rover, set up the Apollo Lunar
Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) and activated the ALSEP transmitters.
The ALSEP signals were received at Goldstone at 2:53:32 GMT on December 12,
at a signal level of -133 dBm on a 26-m-diameter antenna. Several 9-m (30-ft)
stations later reported signal fluctuations of ±1 dB with a period of approxi-
mately 45 seconds and an average level of -137 dBm. Shortly after deployment
of the rover, the CDR inadvertently knocked the right rear fender extension off.
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A temporary fix was attempted using tape, but the extension fell off again
during the one short traverse of the first extravehicular activity (EVAI),
resulting in the astronauts and rover being covered with considerable dust.
The EVA ended after 7 hours 12 minutes.
After a sleep period, the crew began the second EVA. Prior to starting
the traverse, the crew replaced the rover fender extension with a set of four
plastic maps taped together and held in position with a clamp from a portable
utility lamp in the LM. The fix worked perfectly and alleviated the dust
problem. The crew visited four sites, obtaining photographs and samples and
deploying three explosive charges to be detonated by timers after liftoff as
part of seismic studies. During this traverse, the LMP noticed an orange-
colored material that may provide evidence of recent volcanic activity on the
moon and could be the youngest lunar material ever brought back to Earth.
EVA2 lasted 7 hours 38 minute's, the longest EVA. of the Apollo program.
Following another sleep period, EVA3 was begun. Five sites were visited
and one explosive charge was deployed. The LMP attempted unsuccessfully to
repair the Lunar Surface Gravimeter (part of ALSEP), which had not been
working since deployment. The third EVA was 7 hours 16 minutes long. At
the end of this EVA, the crew had explored the surface for a total of 22 hours
6 minutes and had driven the rover 32.0 km (19.9 mi) at speeds up to 17.8 kph
(11.1 mph), all three figures setting records for the Apollo program. Other
records broken were the amount of rocks and soil collected: 117 kg (258 lb)
and the time spent on the moon: 74 hours 59 minutes. Approximately 2120
photographs were taken during the EVAs.
Following EVA 3 and an 8-hour sleep period, the LM blasted off the lunar
surface to rejoin the orbiting CSM. The liftoff was observed on Earth via the
television camera on the rover. This camera continued to provide television
views of the moon until its temperature control unit failed at 08:13 GMT on
December 16. It had been expected to last until battery depletion on approxi-
mately December 25. Rendezvous and docking were also televised, the first
use of the CSM television camera on Apollo 17. The crew transferred the
samples and exposed film to the CSM, then jettisoned the LM for its deorbit
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and subsequent crash on the moon. The crash occurred at 6:50:19 on
December 15 at 190 54' N and 300 30' E. The event was observed by the seis-
mometers from Apollos 12, 14, 15, and 16, and by the four geophones of the
Apollo 17 ALSEP.
The CSM remained in lunar orbit for another 40 hours conducting orbital
science. On this flight, however, there was no Particle and Fields Subsatellite,
as its space was given over to a lunar sounder experiment. Also there was
not enough time in the mission plan for a Bistatic Radar Experiment. Trans-
Earth injection (TEI) was initiated at 23:35:09 GMT on December 16 with an
SPS burn of 144.9 s for a velocity change of 928.51 m/s (3046.3 ft/s). The
TEI maneuver was very accurate, and midcourse corrections 5 and 6 were not
needed. The CMP conducted an EVA on December 17 to retrieve exposed film
and other scientific materials from the SIM bay. Apollo 17 landed at 19:24:59
GMT December 19 at 170 52' S and 1660 8' W, approximately 630 km (340 nmi)
southeast of Pago Pago.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DSN SUPPORT.
1. DSN 26-m Antenna Stations.
As was done with previous Apollo missions, DSS 11 , 42, and 61 were
committed to support Apollo 17 under direct STDN/Manned Spacecraft Center
(MSC) control. Their responsibilities included two-way tracking of the CSM,
LM, S-IVB, and the rover's Lunar Communications Relay Unit (LCRU), which
transmits on a frequency of 2265.5 MHz and receives on the LM uplink
frequency. Scheduling authority for these stations was retained by the DSN for
the entire mission, since the DSN has complete maintenance and operations
re sponsibilitie s.
2. DSS 14.
The Mars station, DSS 14, was required to receive voice, telemetry,
biomedical, and television data and to relay the data to the Goldstone prime
STDN station (GDS). No uplink was required. DSS 14 was also required to
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receive 15-minutes television transmissions from the LCRU approximately
once each day from LM liftoff through December 25. Contrary to previous
missions, there were no requirements for Bistatic Radar reception or for
precision doppler recording at DSS 14.
Several months before launch, NASA questioned the DSN as to whether
DSS 43, the 64-m-diameter antenna station under construction in Australia,
could be committed for Apollo use to avoid the need for the Parkes, Australia,
6 4-m-diameter radio-astronomy antenna. Since the operational date of DSS 43
was not until mid-1973, committed support was impossible. Nevertheless, the
station did track on an uncommitted basis as backup to Parkes, and the acquired
data were used.
C. DSN PREMISSION PREPARATIONS AND TESTING.
1. DSN 26-m Antenna Stations.
A light level of testing was conducted continuously from Apollo 16 to
Apollo 17. As the testing pace increased in late November 1972, a few
problems surfaced. DSS 11 experienced a transmitter tripoff due to a primary
ac overcurrent sensing. Because of several similar problems in the past at
DSS 11, considerable attention was focused upon the problem, which turned out
to be nothing more than a chafed high-voltage cable. DSS 11 was found to
have a doppler problem on December 6 during an STDN test. The problem
was traced to a modified doppler detector that had been installed at STDN
request. With the original detector returned to service, the problem disap-
peared. DSS 11 also experienced a pump failure on heat exchanger No. 2, and
the pump was replaced. DSS 11, 42, and 61 were placed on mission status
by the STDN on December 1.
2. DSS 14.
DSS 14 conducted the normal premission tests as shown in Table 5-2.
In addition, since DSS 14 experienced overloading during Apollo 16 when try-
ing to receive a weak LM signal in the presence of a strong CSM television
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Table 5-2. DSS 14 Tests
Date Test
Nov. 8, 1972 Support constraint testing
Nov. 15, 1972 Configuration verification test
Dec. 1, 1972 Apollo 17 OVT
Dec. 2, 1972 24-h interface test with GDS
signal, a 20-dB attenuator was added after the Mod III maser. This configu-
ration was then tested, even though the Mod III maser was only to be used as
backup to the polarization diversity S-band (PDS) maser.
D. DSN OPERATIONS DURING MISSION.
1. 26-m Antenna Stations.
DSS 11, 42, and 61 successfully supported all phases of the Apollo 17
mission. The problems experienced are noted in Table 5-3.
2. DSS 14.
Nine Apollo passes were tracked, as shown in Table 5-3. The station
had originally been scheduled for short LCRU tracks through December 25,
but, as mentioned earlier, the LCRU ceased to operate on December 16.
DSS 14 experienced a pointing problem on the first pass. The antenna was
pointed manually from 18:40 to 19:09 GMT because the station was unable to
process the 29-point acquisition message. The problem was apparently caused
by a bad punch point at the start of the acquisition message tape. Normal
tracking was again interrupted at 20:57 due to a bad sample on the drive tape.
A new drive tape was prepared from the same acquisition message, and normal
tracking operations resumed at 21:26 GMT.
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0 Table 5-3. Apollo 17 Tracking
( Date/GMT, h:min Problems Date/GMT, h:min Problems
0
DSS 11 DSS 42
Dec 7/18:31 - 03:47 100-channel event recorder inoperative Dec 7/23:09 - 11:53 None
23:52 - 01:57 Dec 8/23:39-12:03 None
Dec 8/18:40-04:20 None Dec 9/23:53-12:05 None(D Dec 9/18:45 - 04:42 None
Dec 10/18:42 - 05:11 Declination angle DATEX jumping in- Dec 11/00:27 - 12:21 None
O termittently 00:42 - 01:20. Dec 12/01:22 - 12:50 None
No data loss Dec 13/01:57 - 13:22 None
Dec 11/19:26 - 06:12 None Dec 14/03:05 - 13:56 None
Dec 12/19:43- 06:10 None Dec 15/04:26 
- 14:26 None
Dec 13/20:33 - 07:52 None
Dec 14/20:49 - 08:48 None Dec 16/06:10- 15:09 None
Dec 15/21:15 - 09:19 None Dec 17/06:18 - 15:17 None
Dec 16/22:04 - 10:03 None Dec 18/06:34 - 15:02 None
Dec 17/22:26 - 10:13 None Dec 19/07:22 - 13:54 None
Dec 18/22:36 - 10:23 Antenna drives off in both axes (06:31
S-06:40) due to bad interpolation on DSS 61
O predict
Dec 7/10:43 - 19:06 None
DSS 14 Dec 8/11:24-20:18 None
Dec 7/19:04 - 03:25 Problem with 29-point acquisition mes- Dec 9/11:28- 20:35 None
sage 18:40 - 19:09 and 20:57 - 21:26. Dec 10/11:26-20:33 None
Cut new tape from same message. An-
tenna stowed 22:35- 23:35 due to Dec 11/11:52 - 21:37 None
high winds Dec 12/11:54 - 22:22 None
Dec 9/18:53 - 03:00 Backup Mod III maser red
9/1500 - 10/0200 Dec 13/12:56 - 23:52 None
Dec 10/18:52 - 03:27 Lost 20 min of 1-s doppler data due to Dec 14/12:48 - 00:59 None
punch being on 60-s rate Dec 15/13:22 - 01:30 None
Dec 11/19:29 - 05:37 None
Dec 12/19:43 - 06:36 None Dec 16/14:06 - 03:09 None
Dec 13/20:11 - 07:43 None Dec 17/14:13 - 03:16 None
Dec 14/20:41 - 08:49 None
Dec 15/21:17 - 03:28 None Dec 18/13:59-03:31 None
Dec 16/22:39 - 04:30 None Dec 19/16:38 - 19:23 None
,,
Beginning at 17:00 on December 8, problems were experienced with the
Mod III maser. The maser was out of service three times until it was reliably
back in service at 16:30 on December 10. Since the Mod IIImaser is only used
for backup on Apollo, its problems did not affect Apollo support.
3. Ground Communications Facility Participation.
The Ground Communications Facility (GCF) provided voice, teletype,
and high-speed data circuits to support the DSN Apollo operations. In addition,
JPL acts as the West Coast switching center for the NASA Communications
Network and handles many non-DSN circuits, including video channels, in
support of Apollo. There were no known GCF anomalies.
4. Mission Control and Computing Center Participation.
The Mission Control and Computing Center (MCCC) areas and equip-
ment used for the Apollo 17 mission included the Operations Area, the Network
Analysis Area, the Mariner computer terminal area, and the Univac 1108 and
360/75 computers. The MCCC support was limited to backup predict gener-
ation for DSS 14 (and DSS 43), and some off-line monitoring the operations
area.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF APOLLO TERMS
ALSEP Apollo lunar-surface experiments GET Ground elapsed time
package
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center,
ARIA Apollo range instrumented aircraft Greenbelt, Maryland
ASE Active seismic experiment (on ALSEP) HFE Heat flow experiment (on ALSEP)
BIOMED Biomedical data HGA High-gain antenna
CADFISS Computation and data flow integrated HSK Honeysuckle Creek, Australia,
subsystem test MSFN station
CCGE Cold cathode gauge experiment (on HSKX Honeysuckle Creek, DSN/MSFN
ALSEP) Wing station (Tidbinbilla)
CDH Constant delta height (maneuver dur- IU Instrumentation unit (part of S-IVB)
ing rendezvous)
IVT Intravehicular transfer
CDR Commander
LM Lunar module
CM Command module
LMP Lunar module pilot
CMP Command module pilot
LO Lunar orbit
CPLEE Charged particle lunar-environment
experiment (on ALSEP) LOI Lunar orbit insertion
CSI Coelliptic sequence initiation LOPC Lunar orbit plane change
(maneuver during rendezvous)
LPO Lunar parking orbit
CSM Command and service module
LS Lunar stay
DOI Descent orbit insertion
MAD Madrid, MSFN station
DPS Descent propulsion system
MCC Mission Control Center, Houston,
DSCC Deep space communication complex Texas; midcourse correction
EI Entry interface (earth reentry); MILA Merrit Island, Florida, MSFN
engineering instruction station
EMU Extravehicular mobility unit MOCR Mission Operations Control Room
(at MSC)
EO Earth orbit
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,
EPO Earth parking orbit Texas
EVA Extravehicular activity MSFN Manned Space Flight Network
EVCS Extravehicular communication system MSFNOC Manned Space Flight Network Opera-
tions Center (GSFC)
GDS Goldstone, MSFN station
NOD. Network operations directive (GSFC)
GDSX Goldstone, DSN/MSFN Wing station
(Pioneer) NST Network Support Team (GSFC)
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PC Plane change SCM Site configuration message
PCA Point of closest approach SDDS Signal data demodulator system
PDI Powered descent initiation SLV Saturn launch vehicle
PI Project Investigator SMS Spacecraft Monitoring Station
PLSS Portable life support system SPS Service propulsion system
PSE Passive seismic experiment (on ALSEP) TEC Trans-earth coast
PTC Passive thermal control (barbeque mode) TEI Trans-earth injection
RCS Reaction control system TIC Telemetry instrumentation coordinator
RTC Real-time command TLC Translunar coast
RTG Radioisotope thermoelectric generator TLI . Translunar injection
S-IC Saturn booster (first stage) TPF Terminal phase final (part of rendezvous)
S-II Saturn booster (second stage) TPI Terminal phase initiation (part of
rendezvous)
S-IVB Saturn IV booster (third stage - fixed
to IU) TV Television (from CSM or LM)
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